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NO LONGER SECRET: OVERCOMING
THE STATE SECRETS DOCTRINE TO
EXPLORE MEANINGFUL REMEDIES
FOR VICTIMS OF EXTRAORDINARY
RENDITION
“If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for the law . . . .”1
Many, if not all, Americans would likely agree that statesponsored torture is wrong. The very notion of state-sponsored torture
brings to mind countless atrocities committed during the Twentieth
Century. On the other hand, many Americans would equally agree
that the United States, in its national security interests, should use all
means necessary to discover terrorist plots and uncover the
whereabouts of wanted terrorists. To suggest that the United States
itself would engage in questionable methods of interrogation2 that
would rise to the level of state-sponsored torture in its fight against
terrorism would almost certainly elicit reactions of denial, disgust,
anger, and disbelief. Such techniques, however, lie at the heart of the
government’s use of extraordinary rendition.
Extraordinary rendition is a controversial program that the
executive branch, particularly the Central Intelligence Agency, has
allegedly used in its ongoing campaign against post-September 11
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See generally AMNESTY INT’L, ‘RENDITION’ AND SECRET DETENTION: A GLOBAL
SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS—QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (Jan. 2006), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL30/003/2006/en/db1dbfd1-d468-11dd-8743d305bea2b2c7/pol300032006en.pdf (discussing the issue of extraordinary rendition, its practice
by the United States and other countries, and the legality of secret detention); HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, GHOST PRISONER: TWO YEARS IN SECRET CIA DETENTION 6–25 (Feb. 27, 2007),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0207webwcover.pdf (describing in detail the
secret detention of Marwan Jabour, a Palestinian former detainee who was held and mistreated
in a secret CIA detention facility).
1
2
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terrorist plots. It involves the detention, both domestically and abroad,
of individuals who are suspected of having information about AlQaeda and other terrorist groups. After the government detains these
suspects, it then allegedly sends these individuals to secret U.S.
detention facilities abroad, or foreign prisons. American or foreign
officials then subject these suspects to harsh interrogation techniques
that arguably rise to the level of torture.3
Victims of extraordinary rendition have attempted to sue U.S.
officials for damages based on abuses that they sustained either
directly at the hands of U.S. officials4 or at the hands of foreign
governments acting in collaboration with the United States.5
Generally, they have brought their claims either as a Bivens action6 or
under the Torture Victim Protection Act.7 These plaintiffs have
encountered various obstacles to their claims in the federal courts,
which have either refused to extend a Bivens action to the context of
extraordinary rendition or dismissed their cases based on the “state
secrets doctrine.”8 The result is that the federal courts have essentially
created a class of victims of harsh interrogation techniques, arguably
rising to the level of torture, for which relief is not currently available
in the federal judicial system.
This Note explores the implications of how the federal courts have
treated claims by victims of extraordinary rendition. Part I articulates
an overview of the definitions and legal principles underlying the
practice of extraordinary rendition, with particular emphasis on how it
has changed since September 11, 2001. Part II addresses current
“remedies” available to victims: the Convention Against Torture, the
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, the Torture Victim
Protection Act, and the Bivens claim. Part III examines the state
secrets doctrine, the most significant obstacle to plaintiffs bringing a
3 See, e.g., Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends
Interrogations, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at A1 (discussing alleged abuses by U.S. officials
in interrogations of terrorism suspects); see also infra Part IV (describing the treatment of
Maher Arar, Binyam Mohamed, and other terrorist suspects).
4 See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 300–01 (4th Cir. 2007) (dismissing
plaintiff’s lawsuit against the former director of the CIA for abuses he sustained while detained
at a CIA facility in Afghanistan).
5 See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563–64 (2d Cir. 2009) (dismissing plaintiff’s
case against U.S. officials for his treatment, allegedly authorized by the United States, at the
hands of the Syrian government).
6 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
388 (1971) (permitting a victim of a Fourth Amendment violation by federal officers to bring
suit for money damages against the officers in federal court); see also infra Part II.B.2
(explaining the Bivens cause of action).
7 Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
8 See infra Parts III.A–B (discussing the Totten Bar and the Reynolds privilege which,
collectively, are the guiding principles of the state secrets doctrine).
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cause of action under one of the aforementioned theories. Part IV then
discusses two recent extraordinary rendition cases in which plaintiffs’
cases were dismissed: Arar v. Ashcroft9 and Mohamed v. Jeppesen
Dataplan, Inc.10 Finally, Part V completes the analysis of this Note
by: (1) offering a re-evaluation of current remedies that federal courts
have wrongly applied; (2) examining two precedents where victims of
state abuse received compensation through a formal commission of
inquiry: the compensation of Maher Arar by the Canadian
government and the compensation of Japanese Americans interned
during the Second World War by the American government; and (3)
proposing that Congress establish a commission of inquiry into the
extraordinary rendition program in light of the limitations of judicial
relief to victims of extraordinary rendition reinforced by the holdings
of Arar and Jeppesen.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES BEHIND
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION
A. Evolution of the Doctrine of Extraordinary Rendition
One of the challenges of approaching the subject of extraordinary
rendition is the confusion that the term creates in modern parlance.
Indeed, the term “extraordinary rendition” is different from the
traditional definition of “rendition,” which is “[t]he return of a
fugitive from one state to the state where the fugitive is accused or
was convicted of a crime.”11 Margaret Satterthwaite incorporates this
baseline definition when she defines “extraordinary rendition” as “the
transfer of an individual, without the benefit of a legal proceeding in
which the individual can challenge the transfer, to a country where he
or she is at risk of torture.”12 This would seem to imply that, at the
very least, the removal of a person by the government of one country
585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011) (mem.).
11 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1410 (9th ed. 2009).
12 Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the
Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1336 (2007); see also Louis Fisher, Extraordinary
Rendition: The Price of Secrecy, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1405, 1406 (2008) (critiquing that under the
doctrine of extraordinary rendition, “the President claims to possess inherent authority to seize
individuals and transfer them to other countries for interrogation and torture”). Fisher and other
legal commentators maintain that the practical application of executive authorization of
extraordinary rendition, particularly in the post-September 11 context, involves sending
potential terrorism suspects to countries in which they will be tortured. While this author shares
those views, one should acknowledge that President Bush maintained that “[t]he United States
does not torture. It’s against our laws, and it’s against our values. I have not authorized it, and I
will not authorize it.” See Remarks on the War on Terror, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1569,
1573 (Sep. 6, 2006) (discussing the U.S. policy regarding torture).
9

10
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to another country involves a definite legal process, ordinarily
requiring explicit congressional authorization.13 As the American
legal system developed and foreign relations evolved, Attorneys
General took the position that “extradition and rendition require
congressional action by statutes or treaties.”14 They reiterated time
and again that without the express authorization by Congress or
treaty, the President had no inherent power to render foreign nationals
to another country.15 Subsequent “[a]dministrations that did depart
from those principles paid a political price.”16
The idea that the President needs authorization from Congress or a
treaty in order to render someone in U.S. custody to another country
began to change during the Clinton administration. In 1995, President
Clinton signed Presidential Directive 39, authorizing the Secretary of
State and the Attorney General to “use all legal means available to
exclude from the United States persons who pose a terrorist threat and
deport or otherwise remove from the United States any such aliens.”17
Then, in 1998, terrorist organizations working in collaboration with
Osama bin Laden bombed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.18 In response, the Clinton administration
“pioneered the use of extraordinary rendition . . . [although the
13 For much of the history of the United States, the legal process of rendition of fugitives
required a bilateral treaty between the United States and a foreign nation. Secretaries of State
and Attorneys General were reluctant to approve the unilateral authority of the President to
render fugitives to a foreign country absent an explicit Congressional authorization through a
bilateral treaty. See Fisher, supra note 12, at 1407–1412 (providing a general overview and
illustrative examples of the history and rationale for limitations on executive power to render a
fugitive to a foreign country absent a treaty or explicit congressional authorization); see also
Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 9 (1936):

There is no executive discretion to surrender [a fugitive] to a foreign government
unless that discretion is granted by law. It necessarily follows that as the legal
authority does not exist save as it is given by act of Congress or by the terms of a
treaty, it is not enough that statute or treaty does not deny the power to surrender. It
must be found that statute or treaty confers the power.
Fisher, supra note 12, at 1408.
See id. at 1408–09 (detailing the actions of Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and
Attorneys General Charles Lee, William Wirt, and Roger Taney and their determinations, in
demands by France, Spain, and Portugal for the United States to turn over fugitives present in
the United States and wanted in those countries, that the President lacked the authority to render
the fugitives without congressional authority or a bilateral treaty).
16 See id. at 1411 (discussing the political outcry that President Lincoln received after he,
without the authority of Congress or a treaty with Spain, ordered a Spanish subject to be seized
during the Civil War and returned to Cuba for trial).
17 Presidential Decision Directive 39: U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism 2 (Jun. 21, 1995),
available at http://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=62741&coll=limited (login required).
18 See, e.g., James C. McKinley, Jr., Kenya and Tanzania Attacks Are Nearly
Simultaneous, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1998, at A1 (reporting on the nearly simultaneous bombings
outside the U.S. embassies in the Kenyan and Tanzanian capitals, and the belief that Osama bin
Laden was responsible for coordinating the attacks).
14
15
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administration] also pressed allied intelligence services to respect
lawful boundaries in interrogations.”19 In this way, extraordinary
rendition became a power directly and independently claimed by the
executive branch.
B. Extraordinary Rendition and Practices After September 11, 2001
“We don’t kick the [expletive] out of them. We send them to
other countries so they can kick the [expletive] out of
them.”20
The government’s approach to extraordinary renditions changed in
the wake of September 11 and the initiation of the George W. Bush
administration’s “war on terror.” Given the classified nature of the
information surrounding extraordinary renditions, it is difficult to
know precisely how many suspected terrorists that the government
has processed throughout the course of its extraordinary rendition
program. In 2002, however, Dana Priest and Barton Gellman wrote
one of the first investigative stories for the Washington Post about the
extraordinary rendition program. Their article reported:
According to U.S. officials, nearly 3,000 suspected al Qaeda
members and their supporters have been detained worldwide
since Sept. 11, 2001. About 625 are at the U.S. military’s
confinement facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Some
officials estimated that fewer than 100 captives have been
rendered to third countries. Thousands have been arrested and
held with U.S. assistance in countries known for brutal
treatment of prisoners, the officials said.21
Likewise, other than firsthand accounts from victims who have
brought claims in federal court for abuses they experienced as a result
of the government targeting them in its extraordinary rendition
program, little verifiable, unclassified evidence exists with respect to
detention and interrogation tactics. As one official has reported, “‘
19 Priest & Gellman, supra note 3; see also U.S Counter-Terrorism Policy: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 33 (1998) (statement of Louis J. Freeh,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation) (“[PDD 77] sets explicit requirements for initiating
[the return of] terrorists to stand trial in the United States.”). But see Presidential Decision
Directive 39, supra note 17, at 4 (“If we do not receive adequate cooperation from a state that
harbors a terrorist whose extradition we are seeking, we shall take appropriate measures to
induce cooperation. Return of suspects by force may be effected without the cooperation of the
host government . . . .”).
20 Priest & Gellman, supra note 3 (emphasis omitted) (quoting an anonymous official
involved in the United States’ extraordinary rendition program).
21 Id.
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[t]his is a very highly classified area. . . . There was a before 9/11, and
there was an after 9/11. . . . After 9/11 the gloves [came] off. ’”22
Unlike Guantanamo Bay, “the CIA’s overseas interrogation facilities
are off-limits to outsiders, and often even to other government
agencies . . . [and the CIA] often uses the facilities of foreign
intelligence services.”23
The election of President Barack Obama in 2008 did not bring an
end to the extraordinary rendition program, although the Obama
Administration indicated that practices of interrogating terrorist
suspects would be in full compliance with domestic and international
law.24 On his second day in office, President Obama signed an
executive order purporting to ensure the lawful interrogation of
terrorist suspects.25 The executive order, entitled Ensuring Lawful
Interrogations, expressly limited interrogation techniques to those
listed in the Army Field Manual, emphasized the humane treatment of
detainees, and ordered the closure of CIA detention facilities.26 This
“humane approach” to the extraordinary rendition program appears
on the surface to help the United States meet its obligations under
international law; however, the executive order has only solidified
extraordinary rendition as an institution of the executive branch.
II. CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR VICTIMS OF
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION
The developing doctrine of extraordinary rendition consolidates
executive power to detain, remove, and interrogate terrorist suspects.
Juxtaposed against this is a legal framework recognizing the need to
protect and compensate victims of torture or abuse by the state or its
agents. The United States is a party to international conventions
prohibiting the use of torture and provides statutory remedies to
torture victims.27 Additionally, the Supreme Court of the United
States has recognized the need to provide judicial remedies to victims

22 Id. (citing the description of Cofer Black, former head of the CIA Counterterrorist
Center, who spoke about the agency’s “new forms of ‘operational flexibility’”).
23 Id.
24 See David Johnston, Rendition to Continue, but with Better Oversight, U.S. Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 2009, at A8 (reporting that the extraordinary rendition process begun under
President Clinton and expanded under President George W. Bush would continue, but with
closer scrutiny to ensure that interrogations were lawful and did not use physical force).
25 Exec. Order No. 13,491, 3 C.F.R. 199 (2009).
26 Id. at 200–02.
27 See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–256, § 2, 106 Stat. 73
(1992) reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (establishing a cause of action for individuals
subjected to torture to bring against their assailants); see also infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the
Torture Victim Prevention Act).
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of abuse by public officials.28 Victims of extraordinary rendition have
attempted to seek redress in the federal courts within these existing
legal frameworks.
A. Laws Prohibiting Torture
1. Convention Against Torture
In 1988, the United States became a signatory to the United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.29 Article 1 of the Convention
defines torture as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such
purposes as obtaining from him [sic] or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him [sic] for an act he
[sic] or a third person has committed or is suspected of
having committed . . . when such pain or suffering is inflicted
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence
of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only
from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.30
Of particular relevance in the context of extraordinary rendition is
Article 3 of the Convention:
No State Party shall expel, return . . . or extradite a person to
another state where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to
torture. For the purpose of determining whether there are
substantial grounds, the competent authorities shall take into
account all relevant considerations including, where
applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a
consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of
human rights.31

28 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
388 (1971) (holding that a petitioner whose claim “states a cause under the Fourth
Amendment . . . is entitled to recover money damages for any injuries he has suffered as a
result . . . ”); see also infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the Bivens remedy which individuals can seek
against the government for engaging in the practice of torture).
29 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture or
Convention].
30 Convention Against Torture, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113–14, art. 1.
31 Convention Against Torture, 1465 U.N.T.S., art. 3.
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President Reagan signed the Convention Against Torture on April
18, 1988, and the Convention was ratified by the Senate on October
27, 1990, subject to certain declarations, reservations, and
understandings.32 According to the United States’ understanding of
the Convention, in order to “acquiesce to an act of torture, that
official must, ‘prior to the activity constituting torture, have
awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her . . . legal
responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.’”33
2. The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998
In light of the Senate’s determination that the Convention Against
Torture was not self-executing, in 1998 Congress enacted the Foreign
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act [FARR Act].34 The FARR Act
provides in pertinent part:
It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel,
extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any
person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for
believing the person would be in danger of being subject to
torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present
in the United States.35
The FARR Act also directs appropriate agencies to “prescribe
regulations to implement the obligations of the United States under
Article 3 [of the Convention Against Torture].”36
In this way, the FARR Act was designed to allow the United States
to meet its obligations under the Convention Against Torture by
prohibiting the removal of a person to a foreign country where he or
she would be tortured. The application of the FARR Act, however, is
not without its jurisdictional limitations. Indeed, Congress limited the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear a claim under the FARR Act
in section 2242(d), which states:

32 See Message to the Senate Transmitting the Convention Against Torture and Inhuman
Treatment or Punishment, 1 PUB. PAPERS 623 (May 20, 1988) (asking the Senate to ratify the
CAT and explaining that it was signed with reservations, understandings and declarations); see
also MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32438, U.N. CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE (CAT): OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION TO INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES 5–6 (2008)
(explaining that one of the most significant declarations regarding the Senate’s ratification of the
Convention was that that Articles 1 through 16 were not self-executing, meaning that in order to
fulfill its obligations under the Convention, the United States had to pass implementing
legislation in order to give the Convention domestic force of law).
33 GARCIA, supra note 32, at 6–7 (quoting SEN. EXEC. DOC. NO. 101–30, 9 (1990)).
34 Pub. L. No. 105–277, § 1001, 112 Stat. 2681–761 (1998) reprinted in 8 U.S.C. 1231.
35 Id. § 2242 (a), 112 Stat. 2681–822 (emphasis added).
36 Id. § 2242 (b).
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[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review the regulations
adopted to implement this section, and nothing in this section
shall be construed as providing any court jurisdiction to
consider or review claims raised under the Convention or this
section, or any other determination . . . except as part of the
review of a final order of removal pursuant to Section 242 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act.37
In 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied
the Convention Against Torture, through the FARR Act, to the case
of Petru Mironescu, a Romanian national wanted in Romania for
various charges of automobile theft.38 In that case, the government
appealed a district court order denying its motion to dismiss
Mironescu’s habeas corpus petition. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
dismissed Mironescu’s petition and noted that the FARR Act
explicitly provided jurisdiction to review claims under the
Convention Against Torture only in the context of immigration
removal proceedings.39
B. Current Remedies for Victims of Torture
1. The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991
Article 14 of the Convention Against Torture requires the
signatory parties to the Convention to ensure that victims of torture
have a means through which they can obtain redress and
compensation.40 In response, and in order to carry out the obligations
of the United States under the Convention, Congress enacted the
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 [TVPA].41 The TVPA
Id. § 2242(d).
See Mironescu v. Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 667 (4th Cir. 2007).
39 Id. at 674 (“[The FARR Act] plainly conveys that although courts may consider or
review CAT or FARR Act claims as part of their review of a final removal order, they are
otherwise precluded from considering or reviewing such claims. As Mironescu presents his
claims as part of his challenge to extradition, rather than removal, § 2242(d) [of the FARR Act]
clearly precluded the district court from exercising jurisdiction.”).
40 See Convention Against Torture, supra note 29, at art. 14 (“Each State Party shall
ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an
enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full
rehabilitation as possible.”).
41 Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)
[hereinafter TVPA]; see also H.R. REP. NO. 102–367, at 85–86 (1991):
37
38

One such obligation [under the Convention Against Torture] is to provide means of
civil redress to victims of torture. . . . The general collapse of democratic institutions
characteristic of countries scourged by massive violations of fundamental rights
rarely leaves the judiciary intact. The Torture Victim Protection Act [TVPA] . . .
would response [sic] to this situation.
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provides that “[a]n individual who, under actual or apparent authority,
or color of law, of any foreign nation . . . subjects an individual to
torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that
individual.”42 The TVPA also requires the federal courts to dismiss a
claim under the Act if the claimant “has not exhausted adequate and
available remedies in the place in which the conduct giving rise to the
claim occurred”43 and imposes a ten-year statute of limitations on all
claims.44 Unlike the Alien Tort Claims Act,45 the TVPA is not in itself
a jurisdictional statute.46
As discussed above, the TVPA provides in part that an individual
is liable for money damages for subjecting another individual to
torture while acting “under actual or apparent authority.”47 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has been particularly
willing to uphold this agency theory of liability based on direct and
indirect liability.48 The Eleventh Circuit has based its application of
direct and indirect liability to the TVPA on earlier, similar holdings in
the Ninth and Fifth Circuits.49

TVPA § 2(a)(1).
Id. § 2(b).
44 Id. § 2(c).
45 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States.”).
46 See Kadic v. Karadži , 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The Torture Victim Act
permits the appellants to pursue their claims of official torture under the jurisdiction conferred
by the Alien Tort Act and also under the general federal question jurisdiction of section
1331 . . . .”).
47 TVPA § 2(a).
48 See, e.g., Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 416 F.3d 1242, 1265 (11th Cir. 2005)
(sustaining a TVPA claim where plaintiffs alleged that U.S. corporation “hire[d] and direct[ed]”
its employees and/or agents including a Guatemalan mayor, “to torture the plaintiffs and
threaten them with death . . . .”); see also Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315–16
(11th Cir. 2008) (upholding theory of aiding and abetting liability under the Alien Tort Claims
Act and the TVPA); Cabello v. Fernández-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1158 (11th Cir. 2005)
(upholding suit by survivors of Chilean official who was killed during Pinochet regime against a
former Chilean military officer on the basis that “the TVPA and the ATCA permit claims based
on direct and indirect theories of liability . . .”).
49 See Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315 (“We based our decision in Cabello on the text of the
statutes [and] the decisions of two sister circuits [the 9th and the 5th Circuits].”); see also Hilao
v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 776–777 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the former president of
the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, could be held liable for human rights abuses if proved that
he knew of abuses by military and paramilitary forces under his command and failed to prevent
it); Carmichael v. United Tech. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113–14 (5th Cir. 1988) (assuming, though
not fully deciding, that the Alien Tort Claims Act “does confer subject matter jurisdiction over
private parties who conspire in, or aid and abet, official acts of torture by one nation against the
citizens of another nation.”).
42
43
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2. Remedies for Victims of Abuse by Public Official: The Bivens
Action
Another cause of action that has surfaced in suits against the
government for extraordinary rendition is the Bivens remedy, named
after a 1971 Supreme Court case, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.50 While specific Bivens
remedy claims in the context of extraordinary rendition are addressed
below,51 this Section is an introduction to the principle behind the
Bivens remedy: compensation for constitutional violations by federal
officials. The primary allegation in Bivens was that agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics entered the plaintiff’s home without a
warrant, arrested him, and treated him roughly in front of his wife and
children.52 The Court held that the agents had violated Bivens’s rights
under the Fourth Amendment53 and that he was entitled to recover
money damages.54 The “purpose of the Bivens remedy ‘is to deter
individual federal officers from committing constitutional
violations.’”55 Since 1971, the Bivens remedy has been expanded
outside of the Fourth Amendment search and seizure context only
twice: (1) employment discrimination in violation of the Due Process
Clause56 and (2) Eighth Amendment57 violations by prison officials.58

403 U.S. 368 (1971).
See infra Part IV (analyzing two cases in which the courts declined to extend a Bivens
remedy to victims of extraordinary rendition).
52 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389–90 (detailing Bivens’ complaint that the search was conducted
without a warrant and the he suffered “great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering
as a result of the agents’ unlawful conduct . . . .”).
53 U.S. Const. amend. IV:
50
51

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
54 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (“Having concluded that petitioner’s complain states a cause of
action under the Fourth Amendment . . . we hold that petitioner is entitled to recover money
damages for any injuries he has suffered as a result of the agents’ violation of the
Amendment.”).
55 Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 571 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v.
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001)).
56 See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248–49 (1979) (extending the Bivens cause of
action for damages arising under a violation of Fourth Amendment rights to a cause and action
and damages remedy to a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
57 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
58 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980) (extending a Bivens remedy to the context
of a prisoner who suffered personal injuries while in the custody of federal prison officials).
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III. THE STATE SECRETS DOCTRINE AND ITS BARRIERS TO
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION CLAIMS
A recurring theme arising in extraordinary rendition claims is that
the plaintiff’s suit cannot continue without relying on or revealing
certain information that would compromise sensitive military and
foreign policy information. While Part IV addresses this issue in the
specific context of recent decisions regarding extraordinary rendition
suits, this Section discusses the legal framework of the state secrets
doctrine and focuses on two co-principles of the doctrine: the Totten
bar and the Reynolds privilege.
A. The Totten Bar
The first principle that governs the state secrets doctrine is the
Totten bar, which completely bars adjudication of claims premised on
state secrets. The name is derived from a Civil War era Supreme
Court case, Totten v. United States.59 That case involved an action by
the estate of a Union spy, contracted during the Civil War to infiltrate
Confederate territory, to recover compensation for services rendered
during the war.60 The Court based its dismissal of the claim on the
principle that “public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a
court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the
disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and
respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be violated.”61
The Court added that “[m]uch greater reason exists for the principle
[of barring a suit premised on confidential information] to cases of
contract for secret services with the government, as the existence of a
contract of that kind is itself a fact not to be disclosed.”62
The Supreme Court has since affirmed its holding in Totten in
more recent lawsuits: one brought by an environmental group seeking
to compel the Navy to release environmental impact statements
regarding alleged storage of nuclear weapons in Hawaii,63 and another
petitioning the federal government to provide promised compensation
92 U.S. 105 (1875).
Id. at 106–07 (holding that the action could not be maintained in the Court of Claims
for damages arising from a contract for secret services during the Civil War between President
Lincoln and the spy).
61 Id. at 107.
62 Id.
63 See Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 141
(1981) (holding that unless the Navy openly stored nuclear weapons at the site in dispute, the
judiciary could not force the Navy to release an environmental impact statement under the
National Environmental Policy Act, since the “Navy’s regulations [forbade] it either to admit or
deny that nuclear weapons [were] actually stored [at the naval base].”).
59
60
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to foreign nationals who allegedly performed espionage services for
the United States during the Cold War.64 Thus, while the line of
Totten cases would seem to limit its application to military and
espionage contexts, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
has read Totten (as well as Reynolds, to which this discussion will
presently turn) to “mean that the Totten bar applies to cases in which
‘the very subject matter of the action’ is a matter of state secret.’”65
B. The Reynolds Privilege
The second principle governing the state secrets doctrine is the
Reynolds privilege: an evidentiary privilege that the government may
invoke when state secrets are involved to exclude any privileged
evidence, which can result in a dismissal of the case. The Supreme
Court first officially recognized the doctrine in United States v.
Reynolds,66 which involved the crash of a military aircraft that was
carrying secret electronic equipment, killing three civilian
observers.67 The widows of the civilian observers filed actions against
the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act68 and, under the
discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,69 asked the
Air Force to produce its official accident investigation report.70
The Supreme Court refused to require the Air Force to disclose the
report and sustained the government’s claim of privilege on the
theory that “there was a reasonable danger that the accident
investigation report would contain references to the secret electronic
equipment which was the primary concern of the mission.”71 The
Court concluded that “[w]hen the Secretary of the Air Force lodged
his formal ‘Claim of Privilege,’ he attempted therein to invoke the
privilege against revealing military secrets, a privilege which is well
established in the law of evidence.”72

64 See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 1–2 (2005) (reversing the decision of the lower court
because that decision contravened “the longstanding rule, announced . . . in Totten, prohibiting
suits against the Government based on covert espionage agreements.”).
65 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1078 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied
131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011) (mem.) (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 n.26 (1953)).
66 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
67 Id. at 3.
68 Pub. L. No. 79–753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C.).
69 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (outlining the general provisions and rules of discovery); FED. R.
CIV. P. 34 (outlining the general provisions governing the requests and production of documents
and tangible items).
70 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 2–3.
71 Id. at 10.
72 Id. at 6–7.
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Subsequent case law has developed the Reynolds Privilege into a
fuller test than the Supreme Court first established. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit analyzed the Reynolds privilege under
a three-step framework in El-Masri v. United States.73 Dismissing the
case on the theory that it could compromise state secrets, the Fourth
Circuit established a three-prong test to analyze a case under the
Reynolds privilege. First, the court must ascertain that the procedural
requirements for invoking the state secrets privilege have been
satisfied; second, the court must decide whether the information
sought to be protected qualifies as “privileged” under the state secrets
doctrine; and third, the court must determine how the matter should
proceed in light of a successful privilege claim.74
Under the first prong of its test, the Fourth Circuit noted that the
“privilege . . . ‘belongs to the Government and . . . can neither be
claimed nor waived by a private party.’”75 Also important in the first
prong of this test is the timing of the privilege assertion. In this
respect, the court held that “dismissal at the pleading stage is
appropriate if state secrets are so central to a proceeding that it cannot
be litigated without threatening their disclosure.”76
The second prong of the Fourth Circuit’s test is whether the
information sought to be protected qualifies as privileged under the
state secrets doctrine. The Fourth Circuit noted that “even the most
compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the
court is ultimately satisfied that [state] secrets are at stake.”77 Of
particular importance in the analysis are matters of national security
and foreign policy. Indeed, “[a] court is obliged to honor the
Executive’s assertion of the privilege if it is satisfied, ‘from all the
circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the
73 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007). The plaintiff in El-Masri was a German citizen of
Lebanese descent who brought a Bivens action against the director of the CIA, George Tenet,
and unknown CIA employees. The plaintiff alleged that he was unlawfully detained in
Macedonia and removed to a CIA facility in Afghanistan, where he was mistreated by U.S.
officials. Id. at 300.
74 See id. at 304, 306 (explaining the three steps in this test).
75 Id. (quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7). The court, however, clarified who specifically
may claim the privilege, and under what considerations that claim may be made. See id.
(quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8) (determining that “‘there must be a formal claim of privilege,
lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter’” and that such formal
privilege claim “may be made only ‘after actual personal consideration by that officer.’”).
76 Id. at 308; see also Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F. 3d 1070, 1089 (9th Cir.
2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011) (mem.) (“[F]urther litigation presents an
unacceptable risk of disclosure of state secrets no matter what legal or factual theories Jeppesen
would choose to advance during a defense.”).
77 El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 305 (quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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interest of national security, should not be divulged.’”78 The court
must review claims of privilege, however, “without forcing a
disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect . . . .
Too much judicial inquiry into the claim of privilege would force
disclosure . . . while a complete abandonment of judicial control
would lead to intolerable abuses.”79
Finally, in the third prong of the Fourth Circuit’s test the court
must decide how the matter should proceed in light of a successful
privilege claim on behalf of the government. The court “must assess
whether it is feasible for the litigation to proceed without the
protected evidence and, if so, how.”80 What seems certain is that
under this third prong there are “three circumstances where the
Reynolds privilege would justify terminating a case.”81 The first is
where “the plaintiff cannot prove the prima facie elements of [his or]
her claim with nonprivileged evidence . . . .”82 In the second
circumstance, “if the privilege deprives the defendant of information
that would otherwise give the defendant a valid defense to the claim,
then the court may grant summary judgment to the defendant.”83 In
the third circumstance, however:
[E]ven if the claims and defenses might theoretically be
established without relying on privileged evidence, it may be
78 El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 305 (quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10); see also Al-Haramain
Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1203 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e acknowledge the need
to defer to the Executive on matters of foreign policy and national security and surely cannot
legitimately find ourselves second guessing the Executive in this arena.”).
The Fourth Circuit noted, however, that deference to the executive in matters of state
secrets “does not represent a surrender of judicial control over access to the courts.” El-Masri,
479 F.3d at 312; see also Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1203 (“We take very seriously our
obligation to review [documents that the government claims are protected by the privilege] with
a very careful, indeed a skeptical, eye, and not to accept at face value the government’s claim or
justification of privilege.”); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that
the role of the court must be “to ensure that the state secrets privilege is asserted no more
frequently and sweepingly than necessary, [and as such] it is essential that the courts continue
critically to examine instances of the invocation.”).
79 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8.
80 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1082 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied
131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011) (mem.); see also Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1204 (“The effect of the
government's successful invocation of privilege ‘is simply that the evidence is unavailable, as
though a witness had died, and the case will proceed accordingly, with no consequences save
those resulting from the loss of evidence.’” (citing Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 64)); Kasza v. Browner,
133 F. 3d. 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that a successful invocation of the state secrets
doctrine by the government means that “the evidence is completely removed from the case”).
81 Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1083.
82 Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166. In such a case, the court would proceed with the dismissal as
it would proceed with any plaintiff who failed to establish a prima facie case. See id (“[T]he
court may dismiss [the] claim as it would with any plaintiff who cannot prove [his or] her
case.”).
83 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1141
(5th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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impossible to proceed with the litigation because—privileged
information being inseparable from nonprivileged
information that will be necessary to the claims or defenses—
litigating the case to a judgment on the merits would present
an unacceptable risk of disclosing state secrets.84
In light of this “third” circumstance—dismissal of a case when the
“very nature” of the case would reveal state secrets—the discussion
now turns to examine two recent cases involving extraordinary
rendition.
IV. TWO RECENT CASE STUDIES: ARAR V. ASHCROFT AND MOHAMED
V. JEPPESEN DATAPLAN, INC.
The Second and Ninth Circuits have recently heard two suits for
damages arising from mistreatment of non-citizens as part of the
government’s extraordinary rendition program. Both cases are
illustrative of the troubling legal problems surrounding extraordinary
rendition because they provide firsthand accounts of what is
otherwise a secretive program. They clearly show the deficiencies of
the current legal frameworks within which victims of extraordinary
rendition must operate, as well as the obstacles to relief that such
victims must overcome in successfully proving their case.
The first case, Arar v. Ashcroft,85 involved the treatment of Maher
Arar, a dual Syrian and Canadian citizen who was detained in New
York’s JFK Airport in 2002 while returning to Canada from a
vacation in Tunisia.86 Arar was questioned “about his relationships
with certain individuals who were suspected of terrorist ties,”87 placed
in a detention center, found inadmissible to the United States for
being a member of a terrorist organization88 and ordered removed to
84 Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1083; see also In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 153 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (“If the district court determines that the subject matter of a case is so sensitive that there
is no way it can be litigated without risking national secrets, then the case must be dismissed.”);
Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1241–42 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[I]n some
circumstances sensitive military secrets will be so central to the subject matter of the litigation
that any attempt to proceed will threaten disclosure of the privileged matters.”). The case law
seems to indicate, then, the courts’ willingness to dismiss a case if its prima facie claim is
inextricably premised on—or is itself—a state secret.
85 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
86 Id. at 565.
87 Id.
88 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2006) (describing the grounds in which an alien is
inadmissible to the United States based on membership in or support of a terrorist organization);
see also id. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (“Any alien who at the time of entry . . . was within one or more of
the classes of aliens inadmissible by the law existing at such time is deportable.”); id. § 1225(c):

If an immigration officer or judge suspects that an arriving alien may be inadmissible
under [provisions excluding certain aliens on national security grounds] . . . the
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Syria.89 Prior to his removal, legacy Immigration and Naturalization
Service90 “made a (required) finding that such removal would be
consistent with Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture . . . .”91
Arar spent a year in Syrian custody, and the conditions which he
endured were nothing short of horrific:
[Arar spent] the first ten months in an underground cell six
feet by three, and seven feet high. He was interrogated for
twelve days on his arrival in Syria, and in that period was
beaten on his palms, hips, and lower back with a two-inch
thick electric cable and with bare hands. Arar allege[d] that
United States officials conspired to send him to Syria for the
purpose of interrogation under torture, and directed the
interrogations from abroad by providing Syria with Arar’s
dossier, dictating questions for the Syrians to ask him, and
receiving intelligence learned from the interviews.92
Arar’s complaint sought damages from federal officials as a result
of his detention in the United States and his removal to and detention
in Syria.93 Specifically, Arar’s complaint sought “relief under the
Torture Victim Protection Act . . . relief under the Fifth Amendment
for [his] alleged torture in Syria . . . and his detention there . . . [and]
relief under the Fifth Amendment for [his] detention in the United
States prior to his removal to Syria.”94
With respect to Arar’s cause of action under the TVPA, the
Second Circuit, sitting en banc, held that Arar would need to
“adequately allege that the [federal officials] possessed power under
Syrian law, and that the offending actions . . . derived from an
exercise of that power.”95 Finding no sufficient evidence that the

officer or judge shall (A) order the alien removed . . . (B) report the order of removal
to the Attorney General; and (C) not conduct any further inquiry or hearing until
ordered by the Attorney General.
Arar,585 F.3d at 565–66 .
Now Immigration and Customs Enforcement, part of the Department of Homeland
Security.
91 Arar, 585 F.3d at 566; see also supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the Convention Against
Torture).
92 Arar, 585 F.3d at 566.
93 Id. at 567.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 568; The court also noted that “[a]ny allegation arising under the TVPA requires a
demonstration that the defendants acted under color of foreign law, or under its authority.” Id.
(citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2nd. Cir. 1995).
89
90
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federal officials acted under color of Syrian law, the court dismissed
outright Arar’s TVPA claim.96
Turning next to Arar’s petition for relief under the Fifth
Amendment, the court analyzed Arar’s claim in the context of
extending a Bivens remedy to cases involving extraordinary rendition.
The court explained that, absent explicit action by Congress creating a
cause of action, courts have been reluctant to extend a Bivens remedy
to various situations when “special factors [counsel] hesitation,” such
as, “military concerns, separation of powers, the comprehensiveness
of available statutory schemes, national security concerns, and foreign
policy considerations.”97 After weighing the various policy concerns
in the case—namely, issues relating to national security and foreign
relations—the court refused to extend a Bivens action to the context
of extraordinary rendition because “such an action would have the
natural tendency to affect diplomacy, foreign policy, and the security
of the nation, and that fact counsels hesitation.”98
In the second case, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.,99 the
Ninth Circuit allowed for a rehearing en banc of five plaintiffs, all
foreign nationals, who alleged that the Central Intelligence Agency,
“working in concert with other government agencies and officials of
foreign governments, operated an extraordinary rendition program to
gather intelligence by apprehending foreign nationals suspected of
involvement in terrorist activities and transferring them in secret to
foreign countries for detention and interrogation by United States or
foreign officials.”100 This, according to plaintiffs, allowed the
government to “employ interrogation methods that would [otherwise
have been] prohibited under federal or international law.”101
96 Id. at 568 (“At most, it is alleged that the defendants encouraged or solicited certain
conduct by foreign officials. Such conduct is insufficient to establish that the defendants were in
some way clothed with the authority of Syrian law or that their conduct may otherwise be fairly
attributable to Syria.”).
97 Id. at 573 (citations omitted).
98 Id. at 574. The majority opinion, however, did not delineate what circumstances would
make extension of a Bivens action to extraordinary rendition cases appropriate; rather, it stopped
at the factors that would counsel “hesitation” by the judiciary of such an extension, holding that
“Congress is the appropriate branch of government to decide under what circumstances (if any)
these kinds of policy decisions—which are directly related to the security of the population and
the foreign affairs of the country—should be subjected to the influence of litigation brought by
aliens.” Id. at 580–81.
99 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011) (mem.).
100 Id. at 1073.
101 Id. (internal quotations marks omitted). The plaintiffs were all detained outside of the
United States and none were, at least according to the facts presented in this case, permanent
residents of the United States. The named plaintiff in this case, Binyam Mohamed, “an
Ethiopian citizen and legal resident of the United Kingdom,” alleged that he “was arrested in
Pakistan on immigration charges” and flown to Morocco, where he was subjected to physical
and psychological torture by Moroccan security agents. He was then allegedly transferred back
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The specific claim in this case was against not the government, but
rather a U.S. corporation which provided “flight planning and
logistical support services to the aircraft and crew on all of the flights
transporting each of the five plaintiffs among the various locations
where they were detained and allegedly subjected to torture.”102 The
plaintiffs further alleged that Jeppesen “provided this assistance with
actual or constructive ‘knowledge of the objectives of the rendition
program,’ including knowledge that the plaintiffs ‘would be subjected
to forced disappearance, detention, and torture’ by U.S. and foreign
government officials.”103
Analyzing the case in light of the state secrets doctrine,104 the court
upheld the contention of the government that, under either the Totten
bar or the Reynolds privilege, “[the] plaintiffs’ lawsuit should be
dismissed . . .because ‘state secrets are so central to this case that
permitting further proceeding[s] would create an intolerable risk of
disclosure that would jeopardize national security.’”105 While the
court acknowledged that “some of [the] plaintiffs’ claims might well
fall within the Totten bar,”106 it placed particular emphasis on the
Reynolds privilege as a justification for dismissing the plaintiffs’ case.
Turning to the question of the Reynolds privilege, the court quickly
disposed of the first step of the Reynolds analysis107—the procedural
requirements—by determining that the government complied with the
requirement by filing “General Hayden’s108 formal claim of privilege
in his public declaration.”109 After reviewing the government’s public

to American custody and flown to Afghanistan where he was detained in a CIA “dark prison,”
where he lost a considerable amount of weight. He was then transferred to the U.S. military
prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where he remained for five years before being released and
returned to the United Kingdom. Id. at 1074.
102 Id. at 1075.
103 Id.
104 See supra Part III (providing an overview of the state secrets doctrine, including its two
corollaries: the Totten bar and the Reynolds privilege).
105 Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1083–84 (quoting Brief for United States at 13, Jeppesen, 614
F.3d 1070 (No. 08–15693)).
106 Id. at 1084. The court ultimately concluded, however, that it could not “resolve the
difficult question of precisely which claims may be barred under Totten because application of
the Reynolds privilege leads us to conclude that this litigation cannot proceed further.” Id. at
1085.
107 See supra Part III.B (providing an overview of the three steps of the Reynolds analysis).
108 General Michael V. Hayden (Air Force, Ret.) was director of the Central Intelligence
Agency during the final two years of the Bush Administration. Before his departure in 2009, he
defended the CIA’s interrogation techniques of terrorists. See Greg Miller, Departing CIA Chief
Hayden Defends Interrogations, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at A14 (reporting on Hayden’s
tenure as CIA Director and his defense of controversial interrogation techniques used on
terrorism suspects).
109 Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1085.
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and classified declarations, the court was convinced that under the
second part of the Reynolds analysis, “at least some of the matters
[the government sought to protect were] . . . valid state secrets,
‘which, in the interest of national security, should not be
divulged.’”110 Finally the court held that “dismissal [was] . . . required
under Reynolds because there [was] no feasible way to litigate
Jeppesen’s alleged liability without creating an unjustifiable risk of
divulging state secrets.”111 In dismissing the case, the court reasoned
that “further litigation present[ed] an unacceptable risk of disclosure
of state secrets no matter what legal or factual theories Jeppesen
would choose to advance during a defense.”112
V. REMEDIES FOR VICTIMS OF EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION: RETHINKING EXISTING DOCTRINES AND EXPLORING NEW SOLUTIONS
The Second and Ninth Circuits dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims in
both Arar v. Ashcroft and Mohamed v. Jeppesen. Where, then, does
that leave victims of extraordinary rendition who bring future
petitions for relief in the federal courts? Clearly, the holdings in both
Arar and Jeppesen, coupled with the Supreme Court’s denial of
certiorari in Arar,113 present significant challenges to further litigation
in this area. The holdings in these cases, however, cannot and should
not be the end of the discourse for victims of extraordinary rendition.
This Section examines the shortcomings of the holdings reached by
the majorities in Arar and Jeppesen, with particular emphasis on the
dissents in both of those cases.114 It also analyzes potential remedies,
110 Id. at 1086 (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953)). The government
had asserted four categories of evidence that neither it nor Jeppesen should have been compelled
to disclose:

[1] information that would tend to confirm or deny whether Jeppesen or any other
private entity assisted the CIA with clandestine intelligence activities; [2]
information about whether any foreign government cooperated with the CIA in
clandestine intelligence activities; [3] information about the scope or operation of the
CIA terrorist detention and interrogation program; [or 4] any other information
concerning CIA clandestine intelligence operations that would tend to reveal
intelligence activities, sources, or methods.
Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1086 (quoting Brief for United States, supra note 105, at 7–8).
111 Id. at 1087 (emphasis added).
112 Id. at 1089.
113 Arar v. Ashcroft, 130 S.Ct. 3409 (2010) (mem.).
114 For a more detailed analysis of both the Arar and Jeppesen cases and their impact on
future litigation by victims of extraordinary rendition see Benjamin Bernstein, Comment, Over
Before It Even Began: Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan and the Use of the State Secrets
Privilege in Extraordinary Rendition Cases, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1400, 1426–1429 (2011)
(arguing that although the majority’s expansion of the Reynolds privilege in Mohamed was
incorrect, the alternatives proposed by the dissent are insufficient to provide victims with proper
redress in the federal court system).
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both judicial and non-judicial, the courts and Congress should
consider. Past precedent115 seems to indicate that many years may
pass before these proposed remedies become politically and
practically viable. This should not, however, preclude considerations
of how to produce fair compensation and redress to victims who have
endured significant physical and emotional injuries as a result of their
treatment at the hands of U.S. and foreign officials.
A. Judicial Remedies
1. The TVPA Should Be an Effective Remedy: Misapplication of
“Color of Law” Requirement
Under the Torture Victim Protection Act,116 “[a]n individual who,
under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign
nation . . . subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be
liable for damages to that individual . . . .”117 As noted above, the
majority in Arar v. Ashcroft dismissed Arar’s claim for relief under
the Torture Victim Protection Act because he failed to allege that the
American agents who allegedly authorized his torture “possessed
power under Syrian law . . . .”118
Judge Pooler, however, dissenting in Arar, criticizes the majority’s
treatment of the “color of law” requirement in the TVPA and provides
an important counterpoint about why Arar should have been allowed
to raise a claim under the TVPA. Pooler writes that “[i]n construing
[the color of law requirement] we look ‘to principles of agency law
and to jurisprudence under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.’”119 Section 1983
allows a person to pursue a civil action against an official for
deprivation of that person’s constitutional rights.120 Pooler notes that
115 See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing the nearly forty-year process of obtaining redress for
Japanese Americans interned during the Second World War).
116 Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
117 Id. § 2(a)(1) (emphasis added).
118 Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 568 (2nd Cir. 2009).
119 Id. at 627 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (quoting Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir.
1995).
120 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (emphasis added):

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
One should note, however, that both Section 1983 and Bivens provide remedies for
violations of constitutional rights; however, federal courts have distinguished the two causes of
actions based on whether right exists under federal or state law, and whether the violator was a
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“[u]nder Section 1983, ‘[t]he traditional definition of acting under
color of state law requires that the defendant . . . have exercised
power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’”121
The crux of Pooler’s dissenting argument is that since private
individuals who act in collaboration with state officials are clothed
with “state law,” “non-Syrian actors who willfully participate in joint
action with Syrian officials, acting under color of Syrian law,
themselves act under color of Syrian law.”122 Pooler disagrees with
the majority’s conclusion that “Arar’s pleading was deficient because
he alleged only that ‘United States officials encouraged and facilitated
the exercise of power by Syrians in Syria,’ not that defendants
possessed power under Syrian law which they used to remove him to
Syria to be tortured.”123 As Judge Pooler suggests, however, under
principles of agency law, and especially for purposes of a cause of
action under section 1983, “private individuals may be liable for joint
activities with state actors even where those private individuals had
no official power under state law.”124 Indeed, in interpreting the Alien
Tort Statute,125 the Second Circuit has a precedent of applying
principles of agency law to support claims against non-state actors.126
At first glance, Judge Pooler’s argument may seem convoluted. It
almost conceptualizes the United States as a quasi-private entity in
terms of how the United States related to and acted under color of
Syrian law. Because of this relationship, Pooler argues that the United

federal or a state actor. See Izen v. Catalina, 398 F.3d 363, 367 n.3 (5th Cir. 2005) (“A Bivens
action is analogous to an action under § 1983—the only difference being that § 1983 applies to
constitutional violations by state, rather than federal, officials.”) (quoting Evans v. Ball, 168
F.3d 856, 863 n.10 (5th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Castellano v. Fragozo, 352
F.3d 939, 954–55 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Rogers v. Vicuna, 264 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2001)
(differentiating between Bivens, which offers redress for constitutional violations under federal
law, and Section 1983, which offers redress for violations under state law).
121 Arar, 585 F.3d, at 627 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49
(1988)).
122 Id. at 629.
123 Id. at 628 (quoting Arar, 585 F.3d at 603 (majority opinion)).
124 Id. (Pooler, J., dissenting); see also Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27–28 (1980) (“[T]o
act ‘under color of’ state law for § 1983 purposes does not require that the defendant be an
officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its
agents. Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action, are acting
‘under color’ of law for purposes of § 1983 actions.”).
125 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
126 See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 188–89 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding
plaintiffs adequately alleged the state action element of a claim under the Alien Tort Statute
against Pfizer for non-consensual drug experimentation on Nigerian children); Khulumani v.
Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that in the Second Circuit, a
plaintiff may plead a theory of aiding and abetting under the Alien Tort Statute).
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States should be liable for the Syrians’ torture of Arar. Her argument,
however, is not as convoluted as it seems. It simply calls for greater
accountability of American agents who have circumvented U.S. laws
by transporting Arar to Syria with the knowledge that Syrian agents
could interrogate him under conditions rising to the level of torture. If
a private entity, with no official power under the law of a foreign
state, can nevertheless be liable for operating jointly with that state, it
should follow that a state actor acting jointly with another state actor
should be equally liable.
2. A Bivens Remedy Should Apply: Re-Examining the Majority’s
Opinion in Arar
As discussed above, the majority in Arar dismissed not only Arar’s
cause of action under the Torture Victim Protection Act, but also his
Bivens claim for relief.127 Judge Sack criticizes the majority’s
particular treatment of “special factors that counsel hesitation” in its
refusal to extend a Bivens cause of action to the context of
extraordinary rendition. In his dissent, Judge Sack argues that “we
think it mistaken to preclude Bivens relief solely in light of a citation
or compilation of one or more purported examples of ‘special
factors.’”128 Indeed, Sack seems to place much lower importance on
circumstances that ultimately led to the dismissal of Arar’s case—
among them, the sensitive nature of the evidence surrounding the
case—when he states that “the existence of such ‘special factors’
alone does not compel a conclusion that a Bivens action is
unavailable.”129
Instead, Judge Sack argues, the circumstances of Arar’s case in
particular—“suffer[ing] a grievous infringement of his constitutional
rights by one or more of the defendants,”130—lend support to judicial
consideration of extending a Bivens action to victims of extraordinary
rendition. Sack first emphasizes the argument that it seems “no more
appropriate to await express congressional authorization of traditional
judicial relief with regard to [the plaintiff’s constitutional] legal
interests than with respect to interests protected by federal
statutes.”131
127 Arar, 585 F.3d at 580–81 (holding that a judicial Bivens remedy was inappropriate in
the context of extraordinary rendition for reasons of national security and foreign affairs, absent
explicit congressional authorization of a remedy for victims of extraordinary rendition).
128 Arar, 585 F.3d at 600 (Sack, J., dissenting).
129 Id.
130 Id. at 603.
131 Id. at 604 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 407 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). Sack also relies on Judge
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Judge Sack’s dissent is persuasive because it underscores an
important theme in the majority’s opinion in Arar: the recognition
that Mr. Arar had suffered a legal injustice.132 Additionally, as Judge
Sack notes, “Arar has no other remedy for the alleged harms the
defendant officers inflicted on him.”133 It seems unfair then, as Judge
Sack emphasizes, that the court would simultaneously acknowledge
this injustice and refuse to extend any remedy.
Yet despite the persuasive arguments in Judge Sack’s dissent in
favor of extending a Bivens remedy for victims of torture by or at the
behest of the U.S. government, the viability of such an argument
remains unclear. In Vance v. Rumsfeld,134 the Seventh Circuit recently
attempted to distinguish Arar by allowing a Bivens claim brought by
U.S. citizens allegedly detained and tortured by U.S. military
personnel in Iraq.135 The court in Vance particularly emphasized that
“nothing in [Arar and similar cases] indicates that those courts were
willing to extend the unprecedented immunity that [the federal
government] . . . advocate[s] here, for claims that our government
tortured its own citizens.”136 The opinion in Vance, then, would have
represented an important first step in allowing a Bivens remedy—at
least for U.S. citizens—in such cases. On October 28, 2011, however,
the Seventh Circuit granted the government’s petition for a rehearing
en banc, and vacated the opinion.137 As of the writing of this Note, the
Seventh Circuit has not scheduled oral arguments for the case.

Posner’s argument in Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1989):
[I]f ever there were a strong case for ‘substantive due process,’ it would be a case in
which a person who had been arrested but not charged or convicted was brutalized
while in custody. . . . [I]t would be surprising if the wanton or malicious infliction of
severe pain or suffering upon a person confined following his arrest but not yet
charged or convicted were thought consistent with due process.
132 See Arar, 585 F.3d at 580 (“None of this is to say that extraordinary rendition is or
should be a favored policy choice.”).
133 Id. at 605 (Sack, J., dissenting).
134 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated 653 F.3d 591 (7th
Cir. Oct. 28, 2011).
135 Id. at 622 (distinguishing the claims brought by U.S. citizens in this case, as opposed to
claims brought by foreign nations in Arar and other similar cases, and holding that “we should
not let the difficulty of [Arar and other extraordinary rendition cases] lead us to lose sight of the
fundamentally different situation posed by the claims of civilian U.S. citizens in this case”).
136 Id.
137 Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 591 (7th Cir. Oct. 28, 2011) (noting that a rehearing
en banc was granted and that the opinion was vacated).
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3. Exceptions to the State Secret Doctrine When the Government Is
Arguably Premising Privilege on Violation of Domestic and
International Law Regarding Torture
An exception to the state secrets doctrine where the government is
premising its privilege on a violation of domestic and international
law regarding torture would remedy the problem of dismissal of
extraordinary rendition victims’ cases on “state secrets” grounds.138
The dissent in Jeppesen addresses this issue, particularly as it applies
to the dismissal of Binyam Mohamed and his co-plaintiffs’ case at the
pleadings stage.139
At the heart of the dissent’s argument, then, is the belief that the
majority has reached its decision at a premature stage, despite the
potential validity of the government’s claim of privilege under
Reynolds, by dismissing the plaintiffs’ case at the pleadings level. The
dissent argues instead that if “Plaintiffs here have stated a claim on
which relief can be granted, they should have an opportunity to
present evidence in support of their allegations, without regard for the
likelihood of ultimate success.”140 The dissent would remand the case
for further proceedings in order for the lower court to “determine
what evidence is privileged and whether any such evidence is
indispensable either to Plaintiffs’ prima facie case or to a valid
defense otherwise available to Jeppesen. Only if privileged evidence
is indispensible to either party should it dismiss the complaint.”141
138 One commentator has proposed a framework for non-U.S. citizen victims of
extraordinary rendition that continues to use the traditional – albeit increasingly difficult –
recourse of the federal court system. See, e.g., Andrew Kingman, Note, State Secrets Are a
Privilege, Not a Right: Can Foreign Victims of Extraordinary Rendition and Torture Overcome
the State Secrets Privilege Using the Alien Tort Statute?, 16 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC.
118, 141–146 (2011) (arguing that non-U.S. citizens should continue to bring claims under the
Alien Tort Claims Act; that Congress should pass legislation limiting the government’s ability
to raise state secrets as a defense; and that plaintiffs should choose their appellate jurisdiction
carefully to avoid circuits particularly hostile to torture and extraordinary rendition claims).
139 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1098 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied
131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011) (mem.) (Hawkins, J., dissenting):

Whatever validity there may be to the idea that evidentiary privileges can apply at
the pleadings stage, it is wrong to suggest that such an application would permit the
removal of entire allegations resulting in out-and-out dismissal of the entire suit.
Instead, the state secrets privilege operates at the pleadings stage to except from the
implications of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 8(b)(6) the refusal to answer
certain allegations, not, as the government contends, to permit the government or
Jeppesen to avoid filing a responsive pleading at all.
see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(6) (“An allegation—other than one relating to the amount of
damages—is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not denied. If a
responsive pleading is not required, an allegation is considered denied or avoided.”).
140 Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1100 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 1101.
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The dissent in Jeppesen posits an interesting theory of the
feasibility of an alleged victim’s case. Extraordinary rendition cases
are unique (and frustrating) from an evidentiary perspective in that
they involve facts that may tend to corroborate allegations of abuse by
the government. If the holdings in Arar and Jeppesen are any
indication, however, it would be difficult for the plaintiff to overcome
governmental claims of privilege for state secrets. Certainly, the bestcase scenario would be a congressional statutory exception to (or at
least a more narrow definition of) the judicially created Reynolds
privilege,142 particularly in cases that would tend to imply that the
government itself is in violation of domestic or international law.
Barring that, or a Supreme Court case overruling the doctrines of state
secret privilege espoused in Reynolds, it seems unlikely that the
current judicial interpretations of the Bivens action and the state
secrets doctrine will change.
B. Non-Judicial Remedies: Providing Compensation to Victims
The counterpoints expressed in the dissenting opinions in both
Arar and Jeppesen challenge the rationale of leaving the fate of
victims of extraordinary rendition to the whim of the legislature or
other non-judicial entities—entities that are (theoretically) more
influenced by popular will or dissatisfaction than the judiciary. The
counterarguments expressed in Arar and Jeppesen are important to
understanding the development of the law in the context of providing
some sort of future judicial remedy for victims of extraordinary
rendition. But it seems unlikely that victims of extraordinary rendition
will find relief in the court systems in the near future. Rather, relief
for victims of extraordinary rendition must come in the form of a nonjudicial remedy, which would include some form of compensation for
the victims. This relief, as the following examples will demonstrate,
could potentially arise from any combination of legislative action,
executive action, investigative action initiated by governmental or
142 At least one bill proposed in Congress would have limited the state secrets privilege in
such a way. See State Secrets Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 984, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 417,
111th Cong. (2009) (proposing a series of evidentiary proceedings, including in camera
proceedings and other evidentiary hearings, to simultaneously protect the government’s right to
assert the state secrets privilege in any civil action, and allow litigants to proceed with
meaningful discovery). One commentator has advocated for Congress to pass a “State Secrets
Act,” which would go far in narrowing the executive branch’s ability to assert the state secrets
privilege.” Kingman, supra note 138, at 143. On November 5, 2009, the House Committee on
the Judiciary ordered the State Secrets Act of 2009 reported to the House of Representatives for
consideration. However, as of the writing of this Note, the House has not taken further action.
See 155 CONG. REC. D1297–98 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 2009) (reporting the actions of the House
Committee on the Judiciary ordering H.R. 984 reported to the House of Representatives).
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non-governmental entities, or the diligent effort of public interest
organizations. In spite of the dissents’ misgivings in Arar and
Jeppesen, this may mean subjecting victims more directly to public
suspicion and hostility toward alleged suspected terrorists. Only
through open, public, non-judicial actions, however, can victims of
extraordinary rendition overcome the state secrets doctrine and
achieve any meaningful redress for their injuries.
This Section begins by emphasizing the precedent for
compensation of victims of extraordinary rendition that the Canadian
government has already accomplished in the case of Maher Arar. The
discussion then turns to the case of the Japanese Americans interned
during World War II in the United States. The example of the
Japanese American internment is important for two reasons: first, it
established a significant precedent for victims of governmental abuses
of power; and second, the method by which Japanese Americans
received compensation was unique. Finally, the following discussion
examines potential proposals for non-judicial compensation for
victims of extraordinary rendition, as well as what challenges such
proposals would face in light of the Arar and Jeppesen cases.
As a preliminary note, the government of the United Kingdom
announced in July, 2010 that it would consider mediation and
compensation claims with Mohamed and other detainees at
Guantanamo Bay.143 At the end of 2010, the British government
declared that it would compensate Binyam Mohamed and other
Guantanamo Bay detainees for abuses that they suffered.144 The
British government also indicated its desire to conduct an inquiry into
the allegations of detainee abuse by British intelligence and security
officials.145 Prime Minister David Cameron appointed Sir Peter

143 See Prime Minister David Cameron, A Statement Given by the Prime Minister to the
House of Commons on the Treatment of Terror Suspects (July 6, 2010) (transcript available at
http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/statements-and-articles/2010/07/statement-on-detainees52943) [hereinafter Terror Suspect Statement] (“[W]e are committed to mediation with those
who have brought civil claims about their detention in Guantanamo. And wherever appropriate,
we will offer compensation.”).
144 See John F. Burns & Alan Cowell, Britain to Compensate Guantánamo Detainees, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010, at A14 (reporting the plan of the British government to pay potentially
millions of dollars to former Guantanamo detainees, including Binyam Mohamed); Patrick
Wintour, Guantánamo Bay Detainees to Be Paid Compensation by UK Government, THE
GUARDIAN, Nov. 16 2010, at 1 (reporting that the UK’s motivation for providing compensation
is that “it is in the national interest that the cases are not brought to court so as to protect the
[methods of the MI6] from scrutiny” and “settlement of the claims would allow an inquiry to be
undertaken . . . .”).
145 See Terror Suspect Statement, supra note 143:

As soon as we’ve made enough progress, an independent Inquiry will be held. It will
look at whether Britain was implicated in the improper treatment of detainees held
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Gibson, a prominent British attorney, judge and commissioner, as
Chair of the newly formed Detainee Inquiry on July 6, 2010.146
Human rights organizations criticized the work of the Inquiry from
the beginning, however,147 and on January 18, 2012, the British
government disbanded it.148 Therefore, this discussion will primarily
concentrate on the Canadian inquiry into the treatment of Maher Arar.
1. Relief for Maher Arar: The Canadian Example
The unfortunate reality of a post-September 11, 2001 world is that
many, if not all, American allies have been touched in one way or
another by American efforts to combat terrorism. Further, they have
had to cope with an increasingly international and multi-border threat
of terrorism. The means with which other countries have approached
terrorist threats—and particularly the steps they have taken to correct
wrongs committed in the course of their efforts to minimize terrorist
threats—are fascinating case studies and potential models for similar
United States compensation and redress programs.
In 2006, a Canadian Commission of Inquiry released a report
detailing the treatment of Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen, at the
hands of the U.S. government and the Syrian government based on
information that the Canadian government obtained about Maher
Arar.149 The Report of the Arar Commission states that in the
aftermath of September 11, American officials “pressed their allies to

by other countries that may have occurred in the aftermath of 9/11. And if we were,
what went wrong, and what do we need to do to learn the lessons.
146 Panel
Members,
THE
DETAINEE
INQUIRY,
http://www.detaineeinquiry.org.uk/people/panel-members/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).
147 See United Kingdom: Detainee Inquiry Terms of Reference and Protocol Fall Far Short
AMNESTY
INT’L,
*1
(Aug.
4,
2011),
of
Human
Rights
Standards,
http://amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR45/011/2011/en/36101b51-1a33-4528-88956bccd7158dcf/eur450112011en.pdf (expressing concern about the extent to which the
proceedings would be public, detainees would have procedural protections, and outside
evidence could be introduced into the Inquiry’s hearings); see also International Human Rights
Experts Call for Key Changes to the Detainee Inquiry as Abdul Hakim Belhadj Joins List of
Survivors Refusing to Participate, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 6, 2012),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/01/06/international-human-rights-experts-call-key-changesdetainee-inquiry-abdul-hakim-bel (discussing criticism by prominent human rights officials of
the Detainee Inquiry’s powers and mandate).
148 See Owen Bowcott et al., Inquiry into MI5 and MI6 Torture Roles Abandoned, THE
GUARDIAN, Jan. 19, 2012, at 4 (discussing that, although the British government has expressed
continued interest in a formal inquiry, it has abandoned the current Detainee Inquiry after
numerous human rights organizations voiced their opposition to it).
149 See generally Comm’n of Inquiry into the Actions of Can. Officials in Relation to
Maher Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations
(2006), available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/cs-kc/arar/Arar_e.pdf. [hereinafter Arar
Commission].
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assist [the War on Terror] by investigating terrorist threats within
their borders. Canada received an enormous number of requests for
information from the FBI and the CIA related to all aspects of 9/11,
as well as other potential or suspected terrorist threats.”150 The
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) delegated to the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police151 “prime responsibility for the
investigation of a number of individuals suspected of terrorist
links.”152
The Report concludes with a series of twenty-three policy
recommendations directed toward the Canadian government.153
Recommendation 22, however, specifically recommends that the
“Government of Canada should register a formal objection with the
governments of the United States and Syria concerning their
treatment of Mr. Arar and Canadian officials involved with his
case.”154 The Commission cites the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations,155 noting that under the Convention “a contracting state has
an obligation to inform a foreign national of his or her right to contact
consular officials and to facilitate such contact without delay.”156
Regarding Canada’s cooperation with American officials in joint
terrorism investigations, the Report continues that “Canada has an
obligation to correct any inaccurate information about [Arar] that it
may have provided to American authorities.”157 Recommendation 22
150 Id.

at 66.
of the efforts by Royal Canadian Mounted Police was Project A-O Canada, a
“criminal investigation . . . [whose] focus was to investigate terrorist threats to Canada’s
national security and to co-operate [sic] with others, particularly [Canadian Security Intelligence
Service] and its American partner agencies, in the investigation of those threats.” Id. at 73.
152 Id.at 66. Among the individuals under investigation were Abdullah Almalki and Ahmed
El Maati. Id. at 72. El Maati was “allegedly implicated in a terrorist plot directed at a major
Canadian target.” Id. Part of the basis for Arar’s detention was his knowledge of and
relationship to Almalki and El Maati. Id. at 72–73.
153 See id. at 312–363. The majority of the recommendations detail the means through
which future national security and terrorism conducted by RCMP, CSIS and other agencies
should take particular care to respect human rights and should be particularly careful in
collaboration with countries having questionable human rights records.
154 Id. at 361.
155 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.
261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
156 Arar Commission, supra note 149, at 172; see also Vienna Convention, supra note 155,
at art. 36(1)(b) (providing that if a foreign national is arrested, any communication he or she
makes must be forwarded to authorities from his or her state). The Report notes that:
151 Part

[W]hile [Arar was] in custody at [John F. Kennedy International Airport] in New
York, he had asked to see someone from the Canadian Consulate. The Consulate
General in New York was never contacted concerning Mr. Arar’s request. Moreover,
Mr. Arar was held in American custody for four days without access to a lawyer or
his family. Essentially, no one knew where he was.
Arar Commission, supra note 149, at 172.
Commission, supra note 149, at 362.

157 Arar
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concludes with an assessment of Arar’s treatment in Syria, and Justice
Dennis O’Connor concludes that:
[T]he Syrian authorities tortured Mr. Arar when interrogating
him and held him in inhumane and degrading conditions for
about a year. Moreover . . . they misled Canadian officials
about Mr. Arar’s presence in Syria after he first arrived there.
If Canada has not already done so, it should send a formal
objection to the Syrians.158
Recommendation 23 finds that “[t]he Government of Canada
should assess Mr. Arar’s claim for compensation in the light of the
findings in this report and respond accordingly.”159 In addressing
compensation the Report stresses that “the Government of Canada
should avoid applying a strictly legal assessment to its potential
liability.”160 Recommendation 23 notes that, “[b]ased on the
assumption that holding a public inquiry has served the public
interest, Mr. Arar’s role in it and the additional suffering he has
experienced because of it should be recognized as a relevant factor in
deciding whether compensation is warranted.”161
Significant in Recommendation 23 is the conclusion that the
Commission is “specifically precluded from making any findings (or
even assessments) as to whether the Government of Canada would be
civilly liable to Mr. Arar.”162 If a theoretical American Commission
were to preclude a finding of negligence, this preclusion may not be
as important because Arar’s case was already dismissed in the United
States; however, Recommendation 23 highlights the point that such a
commission would not have to assess legal liability against the U.S.
government in order to achieve the goals of redress and
compensation.
In addition to discussing these theories of compensation, the
Commission makes a particular point to clear Arar’s reputation in the
Report, stressing that:

158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.

at 363.
Arar’s mistreatment in Syria is accepted by the Commission, and documented in the
factual background of his cases in the United States. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 566
(2d Cir. 2009) (discussing the details of Arar’s mistreatment in Syria and his confinement to a
tiny underground cell); Arar Commission, supra note 149, at 32 (“The actions of the [Syrian
Military Intelligence] with respect to Mr. Arar were entirely consistent with Syria’s widespread
reputation for abusing prisoners being held in connection with terrorism-related
investigations.”).
162 Arar Commission, supra note 149, at 362.
161 Id.
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[It had] heard evidence concerning all of the information
gathered by Canadian investigators in relation to Mr. Arar . . .
[and was] able to say categorically that there is no evidence to
indicate that Mr. Arar has committed any offence [sic] or that
his activities constitute a threat to the security of Canada.163
As a result of the report, the Canadian government did reach a $10
million settlement with Arar related to Canada’s role in the United
States’ removal of Arar to Syria, and the Canadian government
adopted all twenty-three recommendations in the Report.164
2. Compensation to the Japanese Interned During the Second World
War
The experience of the Japanese immigrants and Americans of
Japanese ancestry provides an illustrative, pertinent, and relatively
recent example of an entire class of persons mistreated by the U.S.
government who, after more than forty years, had their grievances
compensated and redressed through non-judicial remedies. The
controversial cases discussed in this section, which upheld the
constitutionality of Japanese internment during World War II, have
never been explicitly overruled. Despite this uncomfortable fact,
hundreds of Japanese Americans obtained appropriate redress and
compensation as a result of efforts by Japanese Americans,
particularly Japanese American members of Congress, during the
1970’s. The example of redress and compensation for Japanese
Americans could provide an important precedent for victims of
extraordinary rendition because a similar model would allow victims
of extraordinary rendition to achieve a meaningful remedy outside
of—and despite—established jurisprudence which would seem to bar
them from seeking a remedy in the courts.165
a. Japanese Internment During the Second World War
After the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941,
anti-Japanese sentiment166 came to a head when, in 1942, President
163 Id.

at 59.
Ottawa Reaches $10M Settlement With Arar, CBC NEWS (Jan. 25, 2007, 11:29
PM), http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2007/01/25/arar-harper.html (reporting on Arar’s
settlement and the Canadian government’s formal apology to Arar); see also Press Release,
Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Canada, Prime Minister Releases Letter of Apology to
Maher Arar and His Family and Announces Completion of Mediation Process (Jan. 26, 2007),
available at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1510 (apologizing to Mr. Arar and announcing
that the government of Canada concluded a settlement with him).
165 See supra Parts III–IV (discussing the state secrets doctrine and related recent cases).
166 To understand the historical and legal framework of the Japanese internment
164 See
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Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066,167 which authorized the
Secretary of War and military commanders:
to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent
as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine,
from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with
respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in,
or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary
of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose
in his discretion.168
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
exclusion of the Japanese from the West Coast after the bombing of
Pearl Harbor in 1941, as well as their subsequent internment in
military-controlled camps for the duration of the war, in two
important cases: Korematsu v. United States169 and Hirabayashi v.
United States.170 In both cases, the plaintiffs had been convicted of
violating the Act of Congress of March 21, 1942,171 which made it a
misdemeanor for anyone to:
enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military area
or military zone prescribed, under the authority of an
Executive order of the President, by the Secretary of War, or
by any military commander designated by the Secretary of

experience, one must first understand the Japanese community as it existed on the West Coast of
the United States in the 1940s. Americans of Japanese ancestry, and Japanese immigrants in the
United States, fell into one of three categories: the “immigrants [who were] called the Issei, in
contrast to the first generation of ethnic Japanese born in this country, who [were] referred to as
the Nisei, and those who returned to Japan as children to be educated, who [were] known as the
Kibei.” Roy L. Brooks, Japanese American Redress and the American Political Process: A
Unique Achievement?, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH 157 (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999). Even
though the Nisei were born in the United States and thus American citizens under the Fourteenth
Amendment, “assimilation in America proved difficult for them. In the eyes of many
Americans, the Japanese represented ‘otherness’ and were treated accordingly.” Id. Indeed,
public antagonism of Japanese immigrants to the United States manifested itself in legislation
specifically targeting—and excluding—Japanese immigrants to the United States. See, e.g.,
Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68–139, § 11(a), 43 Stat. 153, 159 (1924) (limiting
immigrant quotas to two percent of the total population in the United States from any given
nation as of the 1890 census, and thus virtually eliminating further immigration from Southern
and Eastern European and Asian countries).
167 Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
168 Id. (justifying the imposition of such exclusions and restrictions by noting that “the
successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against espionage and
against sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense premises, and national-defense
utilities”).
169 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
170 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
171 Pub. L. No. 77–503, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173 (1942).
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War, contrary to the restrictions applicable to any such area
or zone . . . .172
In Hirabayashi, the plaintiff, a Japanese American who resided in
Seattle, Washington (at the time a part of the West Coast military
zone) was convicted of specifically violating (1) a curfew that persons
of Japanese ancestry had to remain in their homes between 8:00 p.m.
and 6:00 a.m.; and (2) failing to appear at a Civil Control Station to
register, prior to the eventual evacuation of persons of Japanese
ancestry from the military zone.173 The issue for the Court, then,
became whether there was a “substantial basis” for the decision by
Congress and the commander of the military zone that “the curfew as
applied was a protective measure necessary to meet the threat of
sabotage and espionage which would substantially affect the war
effort and which might reasonably be expected to aid a threatened
enemy invasion.”174 The Court ultimately concluded that the curfew
on persons of Japanese ancestry—including persons born in the
United States whose only connection to Japan was a Japanese last
name and certain physical traits—was reasonable because “Congress
and the Executive could reasonably have concluded that [cultural
preservation within the Japanese community has] encouraged the
continued attachment of members of this group to Japan and Japanese
institutions.”175
The specific military order at issue in Korematsu was Civilian
Exclusion Order No. 34, which ordered that after May 9, 1942 “all
persons of Japanese ancestry” were to be excluded from the West
Coast exclusion zone.176 Fred Korematsu was convicted of
“remaining in San Leandro, California, a ‘Military Area,’ contrary to
Civilian Order No. 34 of the Commanding General of the Western
Command.”177 The Supreme Court upheld this conviction, stating that
“when under conditions of modern warfare our shores are threatened
by hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the
172 Id.
173 See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 83–84 (detailing Hirabayashi’s violations of the
prescribed military orders concerning persons of Japanese ancestry).
174 Id. at 95.
175 Id. at 98. In its decision, the Court enumerates certain elements of cultural preservation
that supports a reasonable conclusion by Congress and the Executive that the Japanese
community was a potential breeding ground for espionage. Among the evidence that the Court
cites are Japanese language schools in the United States which operated outside regular school
hours; Japanese laws which, under certain circumstances, recognized children of Japanese
immigrants born in the United States as Japanese citizens; and the fact that many persons of
Japanese ancestry in the United States were “of mature years and occup[ied] positions of
influence in Japanese communities.” See id. at 96–98.
176 Korematsu v. United States 323 U.S. 214, 215–16 (1944).
177 Id.
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threatened danger.”178 The Court rejected Korematsu’s argument of
unequal protection. It seemed satisfied with the reasonableness of the
exclusion order given the circumstances of the U.S. war with Japan,
and summarized the justifications for Congressional and military
action against the Japanese on the West Coast as follows:
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because
of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we
[were] at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly
constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West
Coast and felt constrained to take proper security measures,
because they decided that the military urgency of the situation
demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated
from the West Coast temporarily, and finally, because
Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war in our
military leaders—as inevitably it must—determined that they
should have the power to do just this.179
The Supreme Court’s specific holding in Korematsu with respect
to the internment of the Japanese Americans has never been
overturned. Despite the difficulty of this legal precedent, the Japanese
American community, after a nearly forty year struggle, achieved
redress, compensation, and a formal apology through congressional
legislation. This represents an important precedent for victims of
extraordinary rendition: such victims will have to work towards nonjudicial redress and compensation while remaining cognizant that the
federal courts seem committed to upholding the state secrets doctrine.
b. The Japanese American Movement for Redress and Compensation
At the beginning of the 1970s, the Japanese American community,
undoubtedly influenced by the civil rights movements of the 1960s,
faced two questions: whether the community should seek redress
from the federal government, and, if so, what should redress look
like?180 Many of the early redress efforts that ultimately led the way
to the creation of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and
Internment of Civilians181 were led by the Japanese American
Citizens League (“JACL”).182 The general movement toward redress
178 Id.
179 Id.

at 220.
at 223.

180 MITCHELL T. MAKI ET AL., ACHIEVING THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM: HOW JAPANESE
AMERICANS OBTAINED REDRESS 64 (1999).
181 See infra Part V.B.2.c (discussing the creation and findings of the commission).
182 See
About
the
Japanese
American
Citizens
League,
JACL,
http://www.jacl.org/about/about.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (describing the history, vision,
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at the end of the 1970’s was bolstered by a growing positive
perception of Japanese Americans in American society generally, and
a diminishing of pre- and post-war stereotypes about Japanese
Americans.183
Three early achievements for redress that the JACL accomplished
were decidedly non-monetary in nature. The first of these was the
repeal of Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950.184 Title II of the
Act, passed during the communist scare of the Cold War era, gave the
federal government the power to seize and hold persons suspected of
espionage, sabotage, or insurrection.185 On September 25, 1971
President Nixon signed a bill,186 introduced by Senator Daniel Inouye,
to repeal the Act.187 In terms of redress to victims of the Japanese
internment, the repeal of the Act was “largely symbolic;” however it
represented an important step in the redress movement because “it
provided the Japanese American community with political experience
in obtaining federal legislation.”188 From a framework perspective,
repealing the bill also helped undo some of the legislative and legal
foundations impeding the redress movement.
The second early achievement in the redress movement was
President Ford’s revocation of Executive Order 9066 on February 19,
1976.189 Later that same year, President Ford signed legislation
repealing Public Law 77-503, which had attached criminal penalties
to Executive Order 9066.190 The repeal of Executive Order 9066
represented not only a legislative victory for the redress movement,

and mission of the Japanese American Citizens League).
183 See MAKI, supra note 180, at 83 (noting that the shift in Japanese stereotypes in the
1970s).
184 Pub. L. No. 81–831, 64 Stat. 987, 1019 (1950).
185 Id. at 1019–21; see also MAKI, supra note 180, at 65 (describing the provisions of the
Act and noting that the Act used the Japanese exclusion cases as a legal justification for its
passage).
186 Act of Sept. 25, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92–128, 85 Stat. 347 (1971).
187 See MAKI, supra note 180, at 65–66 (discussing the history of the repeal of Title II of
the Internal Security Act of 1950).
188 Id. at 66.
189 See Proclamation No. 4417, 41 Fed. Reg. 7741 (acknowledging the forced evacuation
was a mistake and terminating Executive Order 9066).
190 See National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94–412, § 501(e), 90 Stat. 1255, 1258
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.) (limiting the powers of the President to
declare states of emergency and providing for specified procedures for the declaration of a state
of emergency); see also MAKI, supra note 180 at 71 & 251 n.31 (noting that the National
Emergencies Act specifically repealed Public Law 77–503 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1383),
which had provided criminal penalties for violations of Executive Order 9066); supra Part
V.B.2.a (describing the executive decrees and legislation authorizing the Japanese American
internment).
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but also an important early public acknowledgement of the injustices
of the Japanese American internment.191
Finally, the third early achievement in the redress movement was
President Ford’s pardon of Iva Ikuko Toguri d’Aquino, the Japanese
American better known as “Tokyo Rose.”192 Toguri d’Aquino was
charged with treason for allegedly broadcasting Japanese propaganda
to U.S. troops in the Pacific during World War II.193 As a result of
pressure from the Japanese American community and evidence
tending to negate her guilt, Toguri d’Aquino received a full pardon on
President Ford’s last day in office in 1977.194 The lesson was
important for the Japanese American community because it
demonstrated that “through political maneuvering and community
involvement, past wrongs could be addressed.”195
c. The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of
Civilians
While the three accomplishments toward achieving redress
described above were significant, in many ways they were largely
symbolic. Indeed, toward the end of the 1970s, many Japanese
American legislators expressed their doubts about the achievability of
real redress.196 A debate arose within the Japanese American
community as to whether a presidential commission would be the best
191 See Remarks Upon Signing a Proclamation Concerning Japanese-American Internment
During World War II, 1 PUB. PAPERS 366 (Feb. 19, 1976):

We now know what we should have known then—not only was that evacuation
wrong but Japanese-Americans were and are loyal Americans. . . . I call upon the
American people to affirm with me the unhyphenated American promise that we
have learned from the tragedy of that long ago experience—forever to treasure
liberty and justice for each individual American and resolve that this kind of error
shall never be made again.
supra note 180, at 77.
at 77–78.
194 Id. at 78. Toguri d’Aquino was born in the United States but traveled to Japan in July of
1941 in order to take care of her aunt. She was trapped in Japan after being denied passage back
to the United States later that year. Unable to leave Japan at the outbreak of war, she obtained a
job as an announcer at a radio station whose music programs were aimed at American troops.
Although the Japanese military police tried repeatedly to force her to revoke her American
citizenship, she refused. Her conviction for treason upon returning to the United States was
based on conflicting evidence that she had broadcast messages meant to demoralize American
troops. She was convicted and sentenced to ten years imprisonment at a Women’s Reformatory
in West Virginia. Id. at 77–78.
195 Id. at 78.
196 Id. at 86 (“During the late 1970s, not one of the [Japanese American] legislators was
convinced that redress was a viable legislative issue; instead they viewed it as a political
liability.”). Interestingly enough, though his legislative efforts later helped Japanese Americans
achieve compensation, when initially asked about redress, Representative Norman Mineta
reportedly replied “Ko mata ne” (“big trouble”). Id.
192 Maki,
193 Id.
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means of achieving redress and compensation for victims of exclusion
and internment during World War II. Supporters of such a
commission argued that without a commission established by the
president and endorsed by Congress, “monetary redress legislation
might be seen as special-interest litigation and result in a political
backlash against the [Japanese American] community.”197 Opponents
warned not only of the risk that a commission might give an
unfavorable recommendation, but also that older, first-generation
Japanese Americans might die before hearings commenced, or might
be unwilling to testify about their painful experiences in the
internment camps.198
Alongside the JACL, grassroots movements began to arise that
also advocated redress for Japanese Americans. Some of these
grassroots movements arose out of involvement with local issues in
the Japanese and greater Asian American communities and had
become disillusioned with the progress of the JACL.199 One of these
groups was the National Coalition of Redress/Reparations (NCRR).200
The NCRR identified five goals and principles for properly achieving
redress for the Japanese American community: (1) “monetary
compensation to individuals incarcerated or their heirs,” (2) some
form of “restitution to the Japanese American community, (3) the
overturning of the legal basis that justified the evacuation and the
camps,” (4) support for other minority groups who had unjustly
suffered from U.S. government actions, and (5) “education of the
American public.”201
Bolstered by the support of groups within the Japanese American
community that advocated clear goals of redress, Congress passed the
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians
Act.202 The Act provided for seven commissioners: three chosen by
the President, two by the Speaker of the House, and two by the
197 Id.

at 87.

198 Id.
199 See, e.g., id. at 90 (describing the parallel Japanese American community organizations
that existed alongside JACL).
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Pub. L. No. 96–317, 94 Stat. 964 (1980) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1981). The Act
had three goals:

(1) [R]eview facts and circumstances surrounding Executive Order Numbered
9066 . . . and the impact of such Executive Order on American citizens and
permanent resident aliens; (2) review directives of United States military forces
requiring relocation and . . . detention in internment camps of American citizens; . . .
and (3) recommend appropriate remedies.
Id. § 4(a), 94 Stat. at 965.
President Carter signed the bill into law on July 31, 1980. MAKI, supra note 180, at 96.
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President Pro Tempore of the Senate.203 Commissioners included
former cabinet members, a former Supreme Court justice, a former
ambassador, and clergy members.204 The Commission on Wartime
Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC) held hearings for
twenty days, primarily in cities along the west coast of the United
States.205 The CWRIC heard testimony from legislators and
community leaders—Japanese and non-Japanese alike. Perhaps the
most powerful testimony was that of those Japanese Americans who
vividly and painfully recalled their experiences in the camps.206
The CWRIC compiled the testimony from the hearings and
published its findings in 1982.207 One of its most notable findings was
that, although it had since been repealed, the promulgation of
Executive Order 9066 was not justified by military necessity, but
caused instead by “race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of
political leadership.”208 Indeed, despite the Supreme Court’s holdings
in Hirabayashi and Korematsu, the Commission gathered evidence
and heard testimony from many architects and former supporters of
the Japanese American exclusion plan regretting their decisions.209 As
the Commission noted, however, “in the spring of 1942 . . . not even
the courts of the United States were places of calm and dispassionate
justice.”210
203 Pub. L. No. 96–317, § 3(b), 94 Stat. at 964–65 (1980). Subsequent legislation expanded
the number of commissioners to nine. See Act of Feb. 10, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97–3, 95 Stat. 5
(expanding the number of members that could be selected).
204 See MAKI, supra note 180, at 97 (listing the members of the commission and their
professions).
205 COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION & INTERNMENT OF C IVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE
DENIED 1 (1982) [hereinafter CWRIC].
206 See, e.g., MAKI, supra note 180, at 106–08 (providing examples of testimony by
members of the Japanese American community, many of whom recounted feelings of betrayal
by the U.S. government and incidents of mistreatment of the prisoners within the camps).
207 CWRIC, supra note 205.
208 Id. at 18.
209 See MAKI, supra note 180, at 101 (discussing the acknowledgements of key figures in
the exclusion of the Japanese Americans that they had made a mistake); see also CWRIC, supra
note 205, at 18 (describing the regrets of Justice Douglas, who joined the majority opinion in
Korematsu upholding the constitutionality of the exclusion program).
210 CWRIC, supra note 205, at 116. The Commission noted, however, that despite the legal
standards of Hirabayashi and Korematsu, some lower courts on the east coast presented with
similar questions regarding the loyalty and threat of danger from German Americans reached
different conclusions than those in the west confronted with the Japanese Americans. Id.; see,
e.g., Ebel v. Drum, 52 F. Supp. 189, 196–97 (D. Mass. 1943) (holding that, despite the overall
validity of the military to secure strategic areas from espionage, the exclusion of the plaintiff
from the military zone was invalid because there was not “a reasonable and substantial basis for
the judgment the military authorities made, i.e., that the threat of espionage and sabotage to our
military resources was real and imminent.”); Schueller v. Drum, 51 F. Supp. 383, 387 (E.D. Pa.
1943) (holding that the exclusion of the plaintiff from the eastern military zone, despite
congressional authorization and despite the fact that the plaintiff was a member of an allegedly
subversive German society, was not warranted because she did not pose “such a danger as
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With respect to the economic loss that the Japanese Americans
suffered as a result of their forcible exclusion and internment, the
Commission acknowledged that the evacuees had little time to settle
their affairs, and testimony from evacuees indicated that government
efforts allegedly aimed at securing and protecting property were
unsuccessful.211 Indeed, while in relocation centers, many evacuees
learned of the destruction and looting of their homes and businesses;
others discovered their losses only after returning home.212
Ultimately, the Commission found that “[t]he loss of time, of
potential and of property were to many of the evacuees irreparable
blows—financial blows from which many never wholly
recovered.”213
Perhaps the most important issue that the Commission addressed
was the harsh conditions in the camps. Though the government
allegedly established the camps to “protect” the Japanese American
civilians, they more closely resembled prisons than protective
facilities. The Commission noted that “the camps were built by the
War Department according to its own specifications. Barbed-wire
fences, watchtowers, and armed guards surrounded the residential and
administrative areas of most camps.”214 Although the military police
guarding the centers were meant to only guard the exterior in case of
an emergency, as tensions and discontent rose in the camps, police
shootings of prisoners—whether intentionally or because of
miscommunications—were not uncommon.215 The original residential
design and facilities in the camps were equally Spartan. The initial
design of the buildings provided for no internal walls or ceilings,
although they were later crudely winterized. There was no running
water in the rooms, and the quarters were designed as military
barracks.216 Additionally, many camps had inadequate medical care
for the evacuees.217
One year after publishing its report, the Commission published its
The
CWRIC
made
five
principal
recommendations.218

would warrant denial . . . of her right to due process of law”).
211 See CWRIC, supra note 205, at 121 (describing the economic impact of evacuation on
the Japanese American community).
212 Id. at 122.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 158.
215 Id. at 175–76 (recounting testimony by some prisoners of unprovoked shootings in the
camps).
216 Id. at 159–61 (describing the facilities in the relocation camps).
217 Id. at 163–65 (describing problems arising from shortages of medical supplies, medical
personnel, and reports of disease outbreaks in the camps).
218 See COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION & INTERNMENT OF C IVILIANS, PERSONAL
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recommendations: (1) a joint resolution by Congress apologizing for
the injustice, signed by the President; (2) a formal presidential pardon
for all Japanese Americans convicted of violations of any curfew or
exclusion order; (3) a congressional order directing executive
agencies to liberally review Japanese Americans’ applications for
restitution; (4) appropriations for research and public educational
funding; and (5) appropriations for individual compensation to
surviving evacuees and internees.219 The CWRIC also issued a series
of recommendations for Aleutian Islanders who were also relocated
during the war.220
d. A Community Achieves Justice: The Legacy of the Commission
Based on the recommendations submitted by the Commission on
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, relief finally came
for persons of Japanese descent interned during World War II in the
form of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988.221 The purpose of the Act was
to, among other things: (1) acknowledge injustices of the Japanese
internment; (2) issue a formal apology on behalf of the United States
to those who were interned; (3) provide funding for public education
about the Japanese internment experience; and (4) make restitution to
Japanese Americans who were interned, as well as individuals of the
Aleutian Islands who were evacuated during World War II.222 Indeed,
as Sandra Taylor notes in her essay about the Japanese internment
experience, the Civil Liberties Act was significant because “[n]ever
before had the government granted such redress to an entire group of
citizens for a deprivation of their constitutional rights.”223 Part of the
success for the passage of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 is that it
was supported by a broad spectrum of organizations—many of which
were not specifically ethnically “Japanese”224—and proponents of the
bill took “advantage of those organizations’ contacts, membership,

JUSTICE DENIED PART 2: RECOMMENDATIONS (1983) (providing the Commission’s
recommendations for corrective actions).
219 Id. at 8–9.
220 See id. at 11–12.
221 Pub. L. No. 100–383, § 101, 102 Stat. 904 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app § 1989b (1996)).
222 See Act of Aug. 10, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–383, 102 Stat. 903 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
app. § 1989 (1996)) (describing the purposes of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988).
223 Leslie T. Hatamiya, Institutions and Interest Groups: Understanding the Passage of the
Japanese American Redress Bill, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY OVER
APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE 190, 190 (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999).
224 Id. at 192 (discussing the strength that arose as a result of the cooperation between
Japanese American organizations and other ethnic, religious, and civil rights organizations to
promote the passage of the Act).
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resources, and political expertise to pressure Congress [to pass the
bill]. ”225
It is relevant to note the expectations of the Japanese American
community during the movement for redress. At the beginning of the
movement to urge Congress and the President to create a commission
in the late 1970s, Representative Robert Matsui “urged Japanese
Americans not to have unrealistic expectations about the
commission.”226 The legacy of the CWRIC, however, is that it helped
remind the entire American public that “redress was about more than
lofty principles, historic revision, and constitutional issues. Redress
was about real people who had endured real suffering. Redress was a
human issue.”227
No single act or circumstance contributed to the passage of the
Civil Liberties Act of 1988 in Congress; rather, passage was bolstered
by the documentation gathered by the CWRIC, the coalition of
diverse groups who came together in support of the redress
movement, and the bill’s portrayal as a constitutional issue.228 Two
additional factors also contributed to the passage of the bill: the
leadership of Representative Barney Frank229 as chair of House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental
Relations, and the efforts of Senator Spark Matsunaga, who “all but
guaranteed that the bill would pass in the Senate by a veto-proof
margin.”230
Finally, three key factors influenced President Ronald Reagan’s
signing of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988. The first was the manner in
which Governor Thomas Kean, then the Republican Governor of
New Jersey, presented the bill to him. Governor Kean presented the
bill to President Reagan on an anecdotal level and reminded him of a
medal ceremony posthumously honoring a young Japanese American
staff sergeant killed during World War II—at which a young Captain
Ronald Reagan gave a brief speech to the family.231 The second was
225 Id.
226 MAKI, supra note 180, at 99. Representative Matsui understood the real political
challenges facing the redress movement, and reminded the collaborators of the redress
movement that “the Ninety-seventh Congress, elected with Ronald Reagan in 1980, was likely
to be the most conservative Congress in recent years and unlikely to support monetary redress.”
Id.
227 Id. at 106.
228 Id. at 186–87.
229 Representative Frank had a reputation for championing liberal causes, and as the only
openly-gay member of Congress, “Representative Frank personally knew the pain of
discrimination and prejudice and saw the parallels between what had happened to Japanese
Americans in World War II and the current discrimination against all minorities.” Id. at 164.
230 Id. at 188.
231 Id. at 192–93; see also Remarks on Signing the Bill Providing Restitution for the
Wartime Internment of Japanese-American Civilians, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1054–55 (Aug. 10, 1988)
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the relative importance of the bill to the President and his
administration. While of great importance to the Japanese American
community, the bill was not a major bill for Reagan or his
administration in terms of its political significance for the
administration.232 Finally, Congress and President Reagan were able
to work toward a compromise on key aspects of the bill.233
C. Following Precedent: Establishing a Commission of Inquiry to
Achieve Redress for Victims of Extraordinary Rendition
The example of compensation and redress for Japanese Americans
and Aleutian Islanders evacuated from their homes or interned in
prison camps during the Second World War is an important
foundation for exploring issues of redress for other groups wronged
by U.S. government actions. For victims of extraordinary rendition, it
is an important precedent in two respects: (1) it provides a framework
for a neutral commission to gather testimony and conduct an
independent investigation into the alleged government wrongdoing;
and (2) while Japanese Americans ultimately achieved some
monetary compensation, the history of the Japanese American redress
movement exemplifies various monetary and non-monetary forms of
redress that Japanese Americans achieved. This is particularly
important in the context of a movement to secure redress for victims
of extraordinary rendition in the United States, where monetary
redress is likely not realistic.234 Thus, it is likely that any redress
efforts for victims of extraordinary rendition would primarily be nonmonetary.235

(recounting the story of when President Reagan, as a young actor, paid tribute to the fallen
Japanese soldier by giving a speech at his medal ceremony and affirming, “here we admit a
wrong; here we reaffirm our commitment as a nation to equal justice under the law.”).
232 MAKI, supra note 180, at 197.
233 Id. (noting that President Reagan “felt that Congress had met his administration’s
concerns halfway, and he recognized that since H.R. 442 was an authorization bill, further
concerns could be addressed in the subsequent appropriations bill”).
234 As the Canadian example demonstrates, however, it is certainly not unprecedented. See
CBC NEWS, supra note 164 (“Ottawa has reached a $10-million settlement with Maher Arar
over Canada’s role in a U.S. decision to deport him to Syria, where he was jailed and
tortured.”). Furthermore, in spite of suspending a formal inquiry into treatment of suspected
terrorists, the British government also provided monetary compensation to Binyam Mohammed
and others. See Burns & Cowell supra note 144 (discussing this agreement to pay
compensation).
235 There are, however, certain procedural elements of a well-structured commission of
inquiry that should occur long before any consideration of monetary redress and compensation.
These procedures in themselves constitute a certain level of redress. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L,
TRUTH, JUSTICE AND REPARATION: ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTIVE TRUTH COMMISSION 37
(2007), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL30/009/2007/en/77ee33de-
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The successes of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and
Internment of Civilians and the Arar Commission provide support to
the proposition that a commission to investigate the extraordinary
rendition program and consider compensation for victims is necessary
and appropriate. Congress has the power to conduct investigations,236
and should use this power to establish a commission to investigate
abuse claims by victims of extraordinary rendition. What, then, are
the necessary characteristics of such a commission? Morgane Landel
provides several important preliminary suggestions.237 A central
theme to Landel’s proposal is that the commission be victim centered;
that is, that victims have the opportunity to openly and honestly
testify; that the commissioners themselves, in the interest of fairness
to the victims, represent national and international entities; and that
the commission have the capacity to fully understand the background
of the victims’ claims through subpoena of sensitive documents.238
Additionally, Landel emphasizes the need for the commission to be
open and transparent through public hearings.239
In principle, Landel’s propositions establish a solid framework for
a commission to investigate extraordinary rendition claims. The
CWRIC and the Arar Commission certainly reflect Landel’s emphasis
on public inquiry.240 But one must ultimately consider the recent

d38a-11dd-a329-2f46302a8cc6/pol300092007en.pdf (discussing the importance of establishing
such a commission so that it has the power to make recommendations to the national
government and widely publish its findings to the general public); James L. Gibson, On
Legitimacy Theory and the Effectiveness of Truth Commissions, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter 2009, at 123, 139 (“The most pressing task of a truth commission is to establish
legitimacy with the members of a society. Legitimacy typically requires fair and reasonably
transparent procedures.”).
236 See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 498 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring)
(“Congress unquestionably has . . . broad authority to investigate, to inform the public, and,
ultimately, to legislate against suspected corruption and abuse of power in the Executive
Branch.”); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) (“The power of the Congress to
conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process.”).
237 See Morgane Landel, Proposals for a Truth Commission and Reparations Program for
Victims of Torture by US Forces Since 9/11, 16 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 115, 117 (2009)
(proposing a truth commission to conduct inquiry into the detention of suspected terrorists and
their treatment by U.S. officials).
238 See id. at 139:
In order to be victim centered, a truth commission in the United States should . . .
have a consultation process to ensure that victims are able to participate in setting it
up, should have an equal number of international and national commissioners and
should have strong powers to compel disclosure of documents and compel people to
testify.
239 See id. at 128 (arguing that “[t]he commission should also have the power to hold
hearings in public, at least those taking place in the United States.”)
240 See Arar Commission, supra note 149, at 9–10 (discussing the establishment of the Arar
Commission based on mounting public pressure concerning the role of the Canadian
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holdings of Arar and Jeppesen, which would seem to represent the
willingness of the federal courts to uphold the Reynolds privilege in
the context of extraordinary rendition cases.241 To overcome this
burden, Congress should establish a commission to investigate abuses
carried out by the federal government as part of its extraordinary
rendition program. Congress should grant this commission full access
to all sensitive materials that would otherwise be excluded from a
judicial proceeding under either the Totten bar or the Reynolds
privilege.242 Congress should also explicitly exempt information
gathered by a commission on extraordinary rendition from the
Reynolds privilege. To achieve this, Congress may have to require
that certain commission proceedings be closed to the general public,
and may have to prohibit the commission from publishing the exact
bases of its findings and recommendations if those factual findings
would compromise issues of national security.243 In full accordance
with jurisprudence on the Reynolds privilege, however, the
government should still have the burden of asserting the privilege in

government in the detention of Maher Arar); CWRIC, supra note 205, at 1 (describing the
process and locations of the public hearings and the extent of the evidence that the CWRIC
gathered).
241 See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1090 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011) (mem.) (“[P]artial disclosure of the existence and even some
aspects of the extraordinary rendition program does not preclude other details from remaining
state secrets if their disclosure would risk grave harm to national security.”); Arar v. Ashcroft,
585 F.3d 559, 576 (2d Cir. 2009) (“The sensitivity of . . . classified material are ‘too obvious to
call for enlarged discussion.’ Even the probing of these matters entails the risk that other
countries will become less willing to cooperate with the United States in sharing intelligence
resources to counter terrorism.” (quoting Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988)).
242 The Ninth Circuit in Jeppesen recognized this congressional authority in the context of
extraordinary renditions and noted that “Congress has the authority to enact remedial legislation
authorizing appropriate causes of action and procedures to address claims like those presented
[in Jeppesen].” Jeppesen, 614 F. 3d at 1092; see also id. (quoting Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d
977, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1982):
When the state secrets doctrine ‘compels the subordination of appellants’ interest in
the pursuit of their claims to the executive’s duty to preserve our national security,
this means that remedies for . . . violations that cannot be proven under existing legal
standards, if there are to be such remedies, must be provided by Congress.’
243 The Arar Commission was also constrained by certain closed proceedings in its
investigation of the extraordinary rendition of Maher Arar. See Arar Commission, supra note
149, at 10 (describing the compilation of evidence and witness testimony, and noting that:

The process was complex because of the need to keep some of the relevant
information confidential, to protect national security and international relations
interests. [The Commission] received some of the evidence in closed, or in camera,
hearings and [is] unable to refer to some of the evidence heard in those hearings in
the public version of [the] report.
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order to prevent certain sensitive materials from general public
access.244
Of course, this proposal for a commission to investigate the
extraordinary rendition program contains certain flaws. First, by
limiting the access of information available to the public, and
essentially conducting a secret investigation of a secretive
government program, Congress might decrease the value of an
investigatory commission.245 Indeed, it would certainly make it more
difficult to hold the Executive Branch publicly accountable for the
extraordinary rendition program. Second, unlike the Japanese
Americans, victims of extraordinary rendition lack a common
community forum around which to mobilize and coalesce.246 The
redress movement for victims of extraordinary rendition from within
the United States would likely be championed not by the victims
themselves, but rather by various human rights organizations.247
Finally, the Japanese American redress movement exemplifies the
painfully slow process through which Congress would realistically
operate to provide some form of redress—monetary or not—for
victims of extraordinary rendition.

a discussion of the Reynolds privilege, see supra Part III.B.
Second Circuit in Arar also recognized the shortcomings of secret hearings, and the
preference for open courts, in refusing to extend a Bivens action to the context of extraordinary
rendition. See Arar, 585 F.3d at 577 (noting that such “measures would excite suspicion and
speculation as to the true nature and depth of the supposed conspiracy, and as to the scope and
depth of judicial oversight”).
246 While all victims of extraordinary rendition share the common experience of
interrogation for alleged participation in terrorist activities, not all victims share the same factual
experiences. See, e.g., Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1073–75 (summarizing the various ordeals, means
of detention, and locations of detention that the specific plaintiffs endured). Additionally, many
victims of extraordinary rendition may be inadmissible to the United States on terrorism and
national security grounds. See supra, note 88 (listing statutes describing when such victims may
be inadmissible to the United States).
247 See ACLU Asks Supreme Court to Hear Extraordinary Rendition Case, ACLU (Dec. 8,
2010),
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-asks-supreme-court-hear-extraordinaryrendition-case (announcing the ACLU’s petition of certiorari to the US Supreme Court to hear
the Jeppesen case); AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 2, at 11–12 (detailing Amnesty International’s
specific demands with regard to halting the extraordinary rendition program); US: Torture
Should Not Go Unpunished, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 9, 2010),
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/11/09/us-torture-should-not-go-unpunished (arguing that the
United States has an obligation under domestic and international law to prosecute CIA officials
who have used harsh interrogation techniques rising to the level of torture). While human rights
organizations will play a key role in the mobilization of a redress program for victims of
extraordinary rendition, they may encounter limitations to the extent of their advocacy. See
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2725 (2010) (holding that statutes
prohibiting knowingly providing material support to terrorist organizations did not violate
freedom of speech as applied to organizations and individuals who sought to provide advice and
support regarding peaceful petition of humanitarian relief before the UN and other
representative bodies to foreign terrorist organizations).
244 For
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Victims of extraordinary rendition may face another obstacle.
Unlike the Japanese Americans that the government compensated for
their treatment during the Second World War, victims of
extraordinary rendition are primarily not American citizens.248 This
alone, however, should not hinder efforts to provide them with
meaningful remedies for two reasons. First, American citizens appear
to be in no greater position to overcome the state secrets doctrine in
claims involving their mistreatment at the hands of U.S. officials than
foreign nationals.249 Second, at least one recent example shows that
the government has been willing to take preliminary steps to
investigate grievances by foreign nationals who were victims of
scientific research in Guatemala in the 1940s.250
CONCLUSION
In its recommendations, the Commission on Wartime Relocation
and Internment of Civilians poignantly reminded Congress, “[n]ations
that forget or ignore injustices are more likely to repeat them.”251 Ten
years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has
had to address the challenges of eradicating domestic and
international threats from terrorist organizations. In meeting this
challenge, however, the United States may have compromised its
commitment to human rights and the rule of law through the
extraordinary rendition program. Victims of extraordinary rendition,
for the moment at least, will likely find no relief in the federal judicial
system for their legitimate claims of torture and abuse.

248 Maher Arar is a Canadian citizen. See supra note 86. His compensation by the
government of Canada is thus similar to the U.S. government’s compensation to Japanese
Americans. As of the writing of this Note, however, Binyam Mohamed is a legal resident, but
not a citizen, of the United Kingdom. See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.
249 As discussed above in Part V.A.2, Vance v. Rumsfeld would have appeared to place
American citizens on a different footing than their foreign national counterparts and would have
allowed a claim against the government for claims of abuse by U.S. officials in Iraq; the
Seventh Circuit, however, recently granted a rehearing en banc and vacated the opinion. See
Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 622 (7th Cir. 2011) (distinguishing the claims brought by
U.S. citizens in this case, as opposed to claims brought by foreign nations in Arar and other
similar cases, and holding that “we should not let the difficulty of [Arar and other extraordinary
rendition cases] lead us to lose sight of the fundamentally different situation posed by the claims
of civilian U.S. citizens in this case.”), vacated en banc, No. 101687 (Oct. 28, 2011) (The court
will set oral argument at a later date.).
250 See generally PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES,
‘ETHICALLY IMPOSSIBLE’: STD RESEARCH IN GUATEMALA FROM 1946 TO 1948, at 2–8 (2011),
available
at
http://bioethics.gov/cms/sites/default/files/Ethically-Impossible_PCSBI.pdf
(outlining the work of the commission, which President Barack Obama charged with
investigating allegations of unethical American scientific research practices in Guatemala in the
1940’s).
251 PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED PART 2: RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 218, at 6.
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This should not, however, preclude social justice advocates from
calling into question the legal theories that have barred judicial relief.
More importantly, the past precedent of compensation for Japanese
Americans illustrates that victims of abuse by the federal government
may achieve redress outside the judicial system without explicitly
overturning established legal precedents. While the redress movement
in the United States for victims of extraordinary rendition may be
slow, two of our closest allies—Canada and the United Kingdom—
have already commenced the process.
Victims’ advocates and members of Congress should consider
these examples and begin to move forward with establishing a
commission to obtain meaningful redress and compensation for
victims of extraordinary rendition. In this way, the United States can
begin to strike the appropriate balance between combating terrorism
and upholding respect for proper criminal procedures, the rule of law,
and human rights.
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